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COMMENTS CONCERNING EXAMINATION
AND EVALUATION OF TITLES TO REAL
PROPERTY IN VIRGINIA
EDITOR'S NOTS: The following papers are the product of independent
research conducted by the Property II class during the 1956-1957 academic
year. As such, these papers cover those points which the individual writers
believe to be the main problems associated with the examination and evalu-
ation of titles to real property in Virginia.
1-THE MECHANICS OF TITLE EXAMINATION
A. The Grantor-Grantee Index"
The initial step to be taken in a search of title is to examine
the records to insure that the prospective seller's chain of title is
complete and regular; that is, he can convey what the client desires
to purchase. The examiner's first act must be to find the instrument
by which the vendor acquired his title.2 Since the search of the deed
books themselves, page by page, would be an economically impos-
sible task from the viewpoint of time to the examiner and cost to
the client, the usual and customary practice of title examiners is to
check the Grantor-Grantee Index which is found in the clerk's
Office of the county or city wherein the land is situated.3
This index gives the examiner citations to all documents per-
taining to the land and required to be recorded. It is composed of
two parts: an alphabetical listing of Grantees and an alphabetical
listing of Grantors. In addition to the names of the Grantees and
their Grantors and vice versa, the Index provides the following
information: the date of reception in the Clerk's Office; a brief
description of the property (sometimes woefully inadequate from
the examiner's viewpoint); and the page and volume of the Deed
I The Grantor-Grantee Index, the Deed Books, the Probate Records, the
Judgment Lien Books, and the Miscellaneous Lien Books are all found
in the clerk's office of the county or city.
2 If any grantee in the chain of title has acquired the property by devise or
descent, there will be a gap in the chain of title which will necessitate
a search of the Probate records or other search to fill. For coverage of
this problem, see Sections 2, iDeeds, and 4, Unrecorded Interests, infra.
3 Save for the period 1919-1922, the Grantor-Grantee Index is not considered
a part of the records. See Jones v. Folks, 149 Va. 140, 140 S.E. 126
(1927). See also Va. Code §17-79 (1950), where a positive require-
ment of law is imposed on the Clerk to maintain at all times a Grantor-
Grantee Index. And see Minor, Real Property, §§1293 et. seq. (2d ed.
Ribble. 1928).
Book in which the deed of conveyance or other instrument has been
copied for record purposes.
1. The Grantee Index.
Institution of the Grantee Index search is the first step of the
title examiner in building a chain of title to the property. Starting
with the latest Grantee Index, usually the Daily Index, and with
the last entry under the alphabetical heading conforming to the
first initial of the seller's surname, the examiner must work back-
wards in time until he finds the entry of the transaction by which
the seller acquired title to the property. A notation of the informa-
tion supplied by the entry should be made at this point and then
the deed to which he has been cited should be checked to ascertain
that the property description embraced therein is the same as that
which his client desires to purchase. Each deed should be examined
also to insure that the deed is valid in all respects.4
Having found the seller's grantor, the examiner by following
the same process of search and check can find his grantor, his
grantor's grantor, etc. How far back the search should be carried
is a question of judgment which will vary with the value of the
land, the value of its anticipated use, and the value the client has
put on the legal services of the examiner. A rough guide under most
circumstances would be 'sixty years to a warranty deed'.' Once the
stopping point the examiner has set for himself has been reached,
the examiner will have established a chain of title to the property,
similar to the following example:
Date Date
Recorded Parties Instr. Pg. Deed Book of Deed
6/8/46 N.C. to seller Deed 1874 #40 6/8/46
22/4/13 L.T. to N.C. Deed 886 #18 16/12/12
26/7/12 P.N. to L.T. Deed 402 #17 18/7/12
2/9/1890 J.S. to P.N. Deed 1380 #12 2/9/1890
11/5/50 K.A. to J.S. Deed 2214 # 7 11/5/50
He will now be ready to test the validity of his work by an exam-
ination of the Grantor Index.
2. The Grantor Index.
By use of the Grantor Index, the examiner will be able to
4 For a detailed discussion of the requirements of a valid deed, see Section 2,
Deeds, infra.
5 The legal liabilities imposed by a warranty deed are discussed in Section 2,
infra.
ascertain whether any particular owner of property, as established
by the Grantee Index search, has made any conveyances incon-
sistent with the chain of title previously formulated. That is, any
conveyance which might prevail over the conveyance under which
his client will claim should he purchase the property. Such con-
veyances may be other prior deeds,6 mortgages, 7 tax liens,8 judg-
ment liens,9 foreclosures under such mortgages and liens, leases, 0
and other miscellaneous liens."
The search of the Grantor Index must begin with the first
known grantee in the chain of title as established by the grantee
index search. Using the example above, it can be seen that the
search must begin under the name of J.S. The examiner must
search the Grantor Index from the date of the recordation of the
deed (11/5/50) by which such grantee (J.S.) acquired title to the
date (2/9/90) he, as grantor, transferred title to the grantee iden-
tified by the Grantee Index Search (P.N.)1 2 This search must be
conducted with extreme care to insure that J.S. has done no act of
partial or total prior conveyance or encumbrance of the property
which would prevail over P.N.'s rights under this deed. Assuming
for the sake of simplicity that the examination of the Grantor Index
under the name of J.S. for the period 11/5/50 to 2/9/90 disclosed
no prior deeds and that any and all mortgages and/or liens upon
the property were paid and disposed of before a subsequent trans-
fer to P.N., the next examination must be of the Grantor Index
under the name of P.N. from 2/9/90 to 26/7/12. The reason the
search must be conducted under the name of P.N. after the time
of actual deed to L.T. of 18/7/12 to 26/7/12 is that the recorda-
tion statute in Virginia is a race-notice statute, as respects mort-
gages and deed of trust, which protects a BFP without notice if he
records first. As to deeds, the Virginia statute is a notice statute
which will protect the bona fide purchaser without notice and the
6 Section 2, Deeds, infra.
7Ibd.
8 Section 7, Tax Liens, infra.
9 Section 5, Judgment Liens, infra.
20 Section 5, Judgment Liens, infra. And see Great Atlantic etc., Tea Co. v.
Cofer, 129 Va. 640, 106 S.E. 695 (1921).
11 Section 6, Miscellaneous Liens, infra.
12 See note 14, infra. By statute, the examiner's work has been lightened by
not requiring him to examine for instruments made by persons under
whom the title is not derived nor for instruments made by any person
under whom title is derived before he acquired title of record. See also
Pillow v. Southwest Improvement Co., 92 Va. 144, 23 S.E. 32 (1895).
same search is necessary. Thus it is possible for P.N. to deed the
same land or any portion therof on the day following his transfer
to L.P. to a BFP without notice, and, if such BFP were to record
his deed before 26/7/12, he would be protected and L.T. would
take nothing by his conveyance.'" Assuming that P.N. has not acted
so cavalierly and that the property transferred to L.T. had never
been encumbered prior to L.T.'s recordation, the examiner is ready
now to check the Grantor Index under the name of L.T. from the
date he recorded his title (26/7/12) to the date N.C., the grantee,
discovered by search of the Grantee Index, recorded the deed from
such L.T. to himself (22/4/13). Virginia has also provided by
statute that no search need be made of the records for deed or con-
tracts made by any person under whom the title of the purchaser
is derived before such person acquired the legal title of record.' 4
Thus, no examination need be made under the name of L.T. for
the period 18/7/12 to 26/7/12. By reason of the above-mentioned
recordation statute, the search under the name of L.T. must be
conducted for the period embraced between the date of the deed
to N.C. and the date that N.C. recorded. This basic rule applies to
all parties in the chain of title as evidenced by the Grantee Index
Search. When the examiner has determined that N.C. has good and
complete title, he must continue his search of the Grantor Index
under the name of N.G. from the date of recordation (22/4/13) to
the date of recorded transfer to seller (6/8/46). Assuming that the
land is still unencumbered, the examiner is on the final lap of his
check of the Grantor Index. He must search the Grantor Index
under the name of the vendor from the date of recordation
(6/8/46) up to the present day, including the Daily Index. As-
suming that as of the date the examiner completes his search the
13 Va. Code §55-96 (1950), which states: "Every such contract in writing,
and every deed conveying any such estate or term ..... , when the
possession is allowed to remain with the grantor, shall be void as to all
purchasers, for valuable consideration without notice not parties thereto
and lien creditors, until and except from the time it is duly admitted to
record . .. , but the mere possession of real estate shall not of itself
constitute notice to purchasers thereof for value of any interest or estate
therein of the person in possession."
'4 Va. Code §55-105 (1950), which states: "A purchaser shall not under
this chapter, be affected by the record of a deed or contract made by a
person under whom his title is not derived; nor by the record of a deed
or contract made by any person under whom the title of such purchaser
is derived, if it was made by such person before he acquired the legal
title of record."
records show no encumbrance by the vendor, the examiner, if he
advises his client that the title is marketable and the client desires
to close the transaction, must insure that right up to the minute the
deal is closed, preferably in the Clerk of Court's Office, the Daily
Index shows no encumbrance by the seller. Once the payment and
deed have switched hands, the examiner should insure that the
deed is promptly recorded. In so doing, he will have completed
his search and insured that subsequent transfers and searches will be
proportionately easier for himself and other examiners.
B. Estoppel by Deed, After Recorded Coneyances, and Interests
Outside of the Chain of, Title.
Certain problems incident to the extent to which the search of
the Grantor-Grantee Index must be extended have not been clearly
resolved as yet by either Virginia decisions or by statute. Thus
there is at present a vacuum in the law in these areas. The problem
of estoppel by deed, after recorded conveyances, and interests out-
side of the chain of title will be discussed below with an analysis of
such case law as has arisen in light of the authorities in other states
and Virginia legal writers and authorities. Tentative solutions will
be suggested which must, of necessity, be merely an attempt on the
part of this writer at clairvoyance.
1. Estoppel by Deed.
Estoppel by Deed arises when a grantor, who has no present
title but merely an expectation of future acquisition of title, trans-
fers such expectation as actual title and subsequently acquires such
title. By statute in Virginia,"5 as between the parties, the grantee
will prevail for the statute treats the title as vesting in the grantor
as of the time of the transfer by him. The real problem arises, how-
ever, when, after acquiring title to the property, the grantor trans-
fers to another party the interest he had conveyed before such ac-
quisition. Who will prevail, the first grantee assuming he has re-
corded, or the second grantee, assuming also that he has recorded
but at a later date? Tied in with the above question, is an ancillary
15 Va. Code §55-52 (1950), which states: "When a deed purports to convey
property, real or personal, describing it with reasonable certainty,
which the grantor does not own at the time of the execution of the
deed, but subsequently acquires, such deed shall, as between the parties
thereto, have the same effect as if the title which the grantor subse-
quently acquires were vested in him at the time of the execution of
such deed and thereby conveyed."
question: Is the title examiner required to search for transfers by
the grantor before he has acquired legal title of record?
The statutes, the decisions, and the eminent authority, Minor,
are in conflict, not only as to who will prevail but also as to whether
the title examiner must check the records to determine if the pos-
sibility of estoppel by deed exists. It would appear that the legis-
lature1" as early as 1849 had resolved the point by providing that a
purchaser will be protected against any person in his chain of title
who attempts to transfer any interest prior to his actual acquisition
of legal title of record." Minor treats the situation as the passage
of equitable title to the first grantee, which automatically becomes
legal title when the grantor acquires legal title.'" The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals quote with approval from Minor in the
case of Rose v. Agee."9 However, in Reynolds v. Cook, 20 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the estoppel would work
upon the estate and binds an after-acquired title as between parties
and privies.2 ' The question would seem to be unsettled in Virginia
16 V.C. 1849, c. 118, Sect. 12, now Va. Code §55-105 (1950).
'7 See Pillow v. Southwest Improvement Co., 92 Va. 144, 23 S.E. 32
(1895); Notes, 12 Va.L.Rev. 173 (1925); 26 Va.L.Rev. 385 (1940);
26 Va.L.Rev. 831 (1940).
's 2 Minor, Real Property, §1350, Note 3 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928).
19 128 Va. 502, 104 S.E. 827 (1920).
2085 Va. 817, 3 S.E. 710 (1887).
21 The argument that such a search is necessary acknowledges that though
it would appear that the legislature as early as 1849 had resolved the
point, this statute has been more honored in the breach than in the
application. As early as 1880, the Supreme Court of Appeals in con-
struing that portion of the Virginia Code [Code of 1873, ch. 114, Sect.
4, now Va. Code §55-95 (1950)] which provides: "Any contract in
writing, made in respect to real estate . . . shall, from the time it is
duly admitted to record, be, as against creditors and purchasers, as if
the contract was a deed conveying the estate or interest embraced in
the contract", held: "that there are no words, either expressly or by
implication, excluding contracts in respect to after acquired property.
And as to notice, the register would furnish the same information of the
dealing with future as with existing property. ... we are of the opinion
the articles of agreement in this case was such an instrument as the
statute authorizes to be recorded, and that it was recorded; which must
be regarded as constructive notice to creditors and subsequent pur-
chasers." First Nat. Bank of Alexandria v. Turnbull & Co., 32 Grat.
(73 Va.) 695, 705 (1880). And see 18 L.R.A. 303, note (1892). This
construction was cited with approval in Braxton v. Bell, 92 Va. 229,
23 S.E. 289 (1895), where it was stated that recordation of a contract
required to be recorded under the statute as aforementioned was con-
structive notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers. In the First
National Bank of Alexandria case, this interpretation was obiter dictum.
and, as a tentative solution, it would appear that a search for
estoppel by deed need not be instituted, due to the dictates of time
and expense.
2. After Recorded Conveyances.
The same disagreement exists among the authorities as to the
necessity of examining for conveyances by a grantor after he has
In the Braxton case, the court had to determine whether a contract was
in the purview of the statute and the effect of the statute if within
the act and if without the act. It is true that the contract was held to be
outside the act and thus the interpretation put upon the act was again
mere obiter dictum. But the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has
never held against this interpretation either directly or by implication.
If one grants that the above construction is the law, then an a fortiori
case as regards deeds exists. If the recordation of a contract to convey
or transfer an interest in real estate is constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers, then a priori a recorded deed, which is the actual convey-
ance or transfer of the interest, would be constructive notice to such
subsequent purchaser. And thus the first grantee would have the para-
mount interest and the title examiner would be under a duty to search
the records for evidence of such interest. Va. Code §55-96 (1950). And
see Edison v. Huff, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 338; which states that this
section effectually abrogates the rule laid down in Withers v. Carter,
4 Gratt. (45 Va.) 407 (1848), so far as executory contracts in writing
for the sale of land are concerned, and places them on the same footing
as conveyances of the legal title. Thus conveyances and contracts to
convey are placed on the same footing.
It is, however, unnecessary to rely entirely upon the above, for the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has come to the same result by
their decision in Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 3 S.E. 710 (1887). In
reaching its decision, the Court replied on Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11
How. 297, 325 (1850), in which it was stated: "The principle de-
ducible from these authorities (English and American) seems to be,
that whatever may be the form or nature of the conveyance used to
pass real property, if the grantor sets forth on the face of the instru-
ment, by way of recital or averment, that he is seized or possessed of
a particular estate in the premises, and which estate the deed purports
to convey; or, what is the same thing, if the seisin or possession of a
particular estate is affirmed in the deed, either in express terms or by
necessary implication, the grantor and all persons in privilty with him
shall be estopped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seised
and possssed at the time he made the conveyance. The estoppel works
upon the estate and binds an after-acquired title as between parties
and privies." (Emphasis added.) The court further quoted from French
v. Spencer, 21 How. 228, 241 (1858), "The estoppel works upon the
estate and binds an after-acquired title as between parties and prives."
The Supreme Court of Appeals then said "These principles apply to
the present case and are decisive of it." 83 Va. 817, 824, 3 S.E. 710,
714 (1887). Thus, the provision in the statute has been rendered nuga-
tory. A search must be conducted to ascertain if any such interest exists
under the name of each grantor in the chain of title. Although in the
conveyed title of record. According to Tiffany, 22 the majority of
jurisdictions require a search down to date of every grantor. There
has been only one decision 2S in Virginia and its interpretation has
been the subject of violent dispute.24 It is doubtful that this case
could be considered as authority for holding that Virginia is either
in the majority or the minority. An example of such a situation is
as follows: A conveys to B on June 1st. A then conveys to C,
who has notice of the prior conveyance, on July 1st and imme-
diately C records. On August 1st, B records. C then conveys to D
on September 1st and D records immediately, having no actual
notice of B's claim to title. As between B and D, who wins? The
argument that B should win is that as between C and B, C took
with notice, and, therefore, C does not come under the protection
of the Virginia statute.25 Thus since B recorded before D, B has
won the race. The argument that D should win is based on an inter-
pretation of the Bowman case, supra, wherein it is stated: "It would
be of no avail to appellees to prove notice, actual or constructive,
. . . for no proposition of law is better settled than a purchaser
for value without notice takes a good title from a purchaser for
value with notice.' 26 However, the court did not discuss the effect
of a subsequent recordation of a prior conveyance as affording con-
structive notice. Whether they considered that it was implied in
the above quotation and it was therefore unnecessary to spell it out
is the question presented by this argument. The advocate of this
argument assures the reader that the title examiner in Virginia does
not conduct such a search at present and will likely not do so
until a direct decision makes it mandatory. If such is the case, then
words of Minor, "this rule is to say the least highly inconvenient" and
"the labor of title examination is thereby greatly magnified", it would
appear that recordation of an interest of this nature is constructive
notice to prospective purchasers requiring an examination of all the rec-
ords if such purchaser is to be denominated a bona fide purchaser. 2
Minor, Real Property, §1255 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928). Minor, citing the
Reynolds case states "that it would seem that title by estoppel binds
the land not only as between the parties, but as to a subsequent pur-
chaser from the grantor [after acquiring title], that is, it is binding
upon the grantor or his privies. 2 Minor, Real Property, §1255, Note 7,
p. 1690 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928).
22 Tiffany, Real Property, (2d Ed.) Sect. 567(g), Note 70 (1920).
23 Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 83 S.E. 393 (1914).
24 See Notes, 26 Va.L.Rev. 385 (1940); 26 Va.L.Rev. 831 (1940).
25 Va. Code §55-96 (1950).
26 Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 810; 83 S.E. 393, (1914).
an examiner is protected if he declines to conduct such a search
since even the examiner, as a doctor, is only required to possess the
skill and learning which is possessed by the ordinary prudent mem-
ber of the legal profession in his locality in good standing, and to
apply that skill and learning with ordinary reasonable care. If the
norm accepted by the practitioner in his area is such that a search
of this nature is not attempted, then it would appear that he would
be safe in also not conducting such a search.2 7 As a tentative solu-
tion, it would appear that until a definite case or statute defines this
area more definitively, such a search for after recorded conveyances
is unnecessary.
3. Interest Outside the Chain of Title.
Another problem, which it has been argued remains unsettled
in Virginia, is whether a deed, not in the chain of title, containing
restrictive covenants or easements, if recorded, is constructive notice
of such encumbrance.2 8 In at least two Virginia decisions, 29 it has
been stated that the established rule is that for a deed and its
recitals to operate as constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser,
it must be a link in the purchasers chain of title. Thus, the exam-
iner is under no duty to search the records for any such reserva-
tions. The Bowman case, supra, would appear to rest at least par-
tially on this same rule.
It would be good experience for the beginning examiner to
conduct at least once a complete title search including a search for
the above three interests. Thus, in the event that subsequent cases
or legislation make such a search mandatory, he will be prepared.
As a general rule, however, it is submitted that such a search at
present is unnecessary in most cases.
N. A. C.
2-DEEDS
Circumstances under which deed required:
(a). "No estate of inheritance or freehold or for a term
of more than five years in lands shall be conveyed unless
27 See Notes 26 Va.L.Rev. 831 (1940); 26 Va.L.Rev. 385 (1940).
28 See Letter to Client, Section 9, infra..
29 Claiborne v. Holland, 88 Va. 1046, 14 S.E. 915 (1892); Providence
Forge Fishing & Gun Club v. Gills, 117 Va. 557, 85 S.E. 404, (1915).
And see Bowman v. Holland, supra.
by deed or will, nor shall any voluntary partition of lands
by coparceners, having such an estate therein, be made
except by deed; nor shall any right to a conveyance of any
such estate or term in land accrue to the donee of the land
or those claiming under him, under a gift or promise of
gift of the same not in writing, although such gift or
promise be followed by possession thereunder and im-
provement of the land by the donee or those claiming
through him."'
(b). "No action shall be brought in any of the following
cases... (6) Upon any contract for the sale of real estate,
or for the lease thereof for more than a year ... unless the
promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance or
ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby or
his agent; but the consideration need not be set forth or
expressed in the writing, and it may be proved (where a
consideration is necessary) by other evidence."2
Basic types of deeds
Deeds in general fall into two main subdivisions; deeds in-
dented and deeds poll.
(1). Deed indented (or indenture) contains a mutual agree-
ment between two or more persons, whereby each stipulates for
something on his part.'
(2). Deed poll contains stipulations which are all on one side,
without any reciprocal stipulations on the other. It is therefore "not
an agreement between two or more persons, but a declaration under
seal by some one or more particular persons respecting an agree-
ment or stipulation made by him or them with some other person
or persons."4
Statutory form of deed'
"Form of a deed: A deed may be made in the follow-
ing form, or to the same effect. 'This deed, made the...
1Va. Code §55-2 (1950).
2 Va. Code §11-2 (1950) (Statute of Frauds).
3 Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W. Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78 (1917). See also
2 Minor, Real Property, §1027 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928). "A deed begin-
ning 'this indenture' is a deed indented to every legal purpose" (Currie
v. Donald, 2 Wash. (2 Va.) 58, 63 (1795)].
4 2 Minor, Real Property, §1026 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928).
5 Va. Code §55-48 (1950).
6 See also Gregory's Forms, No. 1722, 4th ed. (1952).
day of ... in the year. . . , between (here insert names of
parties), witnesseth: that in consideration of (here state
the consideration) the said ... ,doth (or do) grant unto
the said . . . , all (here describe the property and insert
covenants or any other provisions). Witness the following
signature and seal (or signatures and seals)."
The common form of deed is divided into five major sections:
(1) Introduction; (2) Granting part; (3) Description; (4) Cov-
enants; (5) Conclusion.
(1) Introduction:
(a) Date: The deed takes effect from the time of delivery
and therefore a date is not essential to the validity of an instrument.7
An incorrect or impossible date will not invalidate the deed.8
(b) Names of Parties: It is elementary that every deed
must have a grantor,9 and it is therefore essential that the deed
sufficiently designate the grantor. It is sufficient however if the
description is accurate enough to identify him, even though not
actually named in the instrument.10 The attorney should also be
sure that the deed states whether or not the grantor is married, as
a conveyance by the husband without the participation of the wife
would not bar the wife's inchoate right of dower. The statement
that the grantor is not married is prima facie evidence of the fact.'
"No particular degree of mental acumen is to be prescribed
as the measure of one's capacity to execute a deed. The
question is answered when it is determined whether, at the
time of the execution of the instrument, the grantor had
sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the
transaction he was entered into and to assent to its pro-
visions."' 12 Those persons incompetent to execute a deed
7Skipwith v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh (35 Va.) 271, 281, 31 Am. Dec. 642,
646 (1837).
8 Colquhoun v. Atkinsons, 6 Munf. (20 Va.) 550 (1820).
9 American Net, etc., Co. v. Mayo, 97 Va. 182, 33 S.E. 523 (1899).
10 2 Minor Real Property, § 1031 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 148 Penn St. 216, 23 AUt. 985 (1892); Houx v. Batteen, 68
Mo. 84 (1878).
11 Cox, Titles to Land in Virginia, Section 99. See also Harman v. Steams,
95 Va. 58, 27 S.E. 601 (1898).
12 Lohman v. Sherwood, 181 Va. 594, 607, 26 S.E. (2d) 74, 80 (1943). See
also Carrigan v. Davis, 84 W. Va. 473, 100 S.E. 91 (1919); Note, 32
W. Va. L.Q. 59 (Circa 1926).
include: infants, lunatics, persons under duress, and enemy
aliens.
The immediate grantee must be in existence when the deed is
delivered, and if there is more than one grantee, each should be so
named or described in the deed as to enable identification. It is suffi-
cient if the identity of the grantee is made certain by the instrument
as a whole, even though not specifically named.'" In the event of
existence of latent ambiguity as to the name of the grantee, it may
be explained by parol testimony.
(2) Granting part:
(a) Consideration: A consideration is not necessary as
between the parties, but as respects subsequent purchasers, the deed
should show the payment of a valuable consideration in order to
negative the possibilities of (1) a gift intended by the grantor to
the grantee, or (2) a resulting trust in the grantee in favor of the
grantor. A recital of such payment is prima facie evidence of the
fact until fraud is shown.14 Mere inadequacy of consideration, in
the absence of fraud, will not invalidate a conveyance, except where
the inadequacy is so great as to shock the moral sense of mankind.' 5
An example of such inadequacy would be where there is inequality
between the parties and their relation is such as to warrant the pre-
sumption that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff's il-
literacy or ignorance.
(b) Parties: A deed regular in other respects has been
held not to be invalid because the grantor or the grantee is not
named or referred to in the granting clause, effect being given to
the plain intent shown by the deed.' 6
(c) Technical words: The word "grant" is not indispen-
sable, since intent to convey is sufficient. Other words deemed ac-
ceptable are; "convey", "give", "sell", "transfer", and in some situ-
ations "assign", "confirm", "set over", "surrender", have been held
sufficient.
'3Lagorio v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 22 S.E. 239 (1895). See also 2 Minor,
Real Property § 1031 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
1 2 Minor, Real Property, §1082 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
25 Mayo v. Carrington, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 74 (1869).
16 Lagorio v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 22 S.E. 239, (1895). See also 2 Minor,
Real Property, § 1031 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
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(3) Covenants of the grantor:
The usual express covenants for title by the grantor are:
(1) seisin, (2) right to convey, (3) against encumbrances, (4) quiet
possession, (5) further assurances, (6) general and special war-
ranty.17 The first five covenants are the so-called English covenants
of title and with the covenant of general warranty may be subdi-
vided further into present covenants (seisin; right to convey; against
encumbrances) and future covenants (quiet possession; further
assurances; general warranty). Present covenants do not run with
the land, and if breached, the breach occurs at the time when the
conveyance is made, while future covenants, which run with the
land, are breached only at the time that peaceful possession is dis-
turbed.
The statute of limitations is applied differently, running imme-
diately once the present covenant is made and breached; but with
respect to future covenants, not running until paramount interest is
asserted.
The covenants of general and special warranties, used as sub-
stitutes for the more verbose English covenants, are most popular in
America as a whole and in Virginia in particular. The deed which
contains the warranty takes its name from the type of warranty-
thus a general warranty deed is one in which the grantor warrants
the title against defects -arising at any time, either before or after
the grantor became connected with the land, and as a result is, in
effect, substantially the same as a covenant for quiet enjoyment. A
special warranty deed on the other hand is one in which the grantor
warrants the title against defects arising after he acquired the land,
but not against defects arising before that time."8
A third type of deed-the quitclaim deed-contains no war-
ranties whatsoever, the grantor warranting nothing but rather
merely transferring what title he has, if any.1 9 This type of deed is
the least desirable form of conveyance, since by the English and
Virginia view, .... a quitclaim deed is in itself notice of a possibly
defective title. Hence under this view, a party who bases his claim
of title wholly or in part, upon a quitclaim deed occupies a precari-
17 Va. Code §§55-68 and 55-74 (1950).
18 2 Minor, Real Property §§1053-1055 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
19 Va. Code §55-75 (1950).
ous position."20 It is apparant therefore that a claim under a quit-
claim deed will be subordinated to a prior unrecorded deed.
2 1
As to the measure of damages for the breach of cove-
nant or warranty, it has been held that the true measure is
the "value of the land at the time of the warranty, that is,
at the time of the conveyance; and the best standard of
such value is in general the price agreed upon at the time
of sale, or so much thereof as has been paid (with interest
from the date of eviction) and the legal and taxable costs
expended in the action in which the eviction occurs. But
nominal damages only will be recoverable if no actual loss
has been sustained by reason of the breach."
22
(4) Description:23
The title examiner should insist upon a description which
will be clearly valid, not only between the parties to the deed, but
also against adverse purchasers for value without notice. The de-
scription to be effective must be sufficient to identify the same with
reasonable certainty,24 and if it does not, the deed is void. If the
deed is not completely certain, extrinsic evidence is admissable to
indicate the land described.25
The following methods of description are considered to be
legally sufficient if the county, city and state are stated.26
(a) By courses and distances with a starting point that
can be identified.2 7
(b) As bounded by natural or artificial objects or by the
lands of named persons.
28
20 Bohannon, Quitclaim Deeds under the Recording Acts, 32 Va. L. Rev.
190, 191 (1945). See also Johnson v. Williams, 37 Kan. 179, 14 P. 537
(1887)-Va. in accord, See 2 Minor, Real Property, §1131 (2d Ed.
Ribble, 1928).
21 For further discussion, see Section 4, Unrecorded Interests, infra.
22 2 Minor, Real Property, §1057 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also Threkeld
v. Fitzhugh, 2 Leigh (29 Va.) 489 (1830); Morgan v. Haley, 107 Va.
337, 58 S.E. 564 (1907); Stuart v. Pennis, 100 Va. 615, 42 S.E. 667
(1902); Building, L. & W. Co. v. Fray, 96 Va. 559, 32 S.E. 58 (1899).
23 Generally, see Cox, Titles to Land in Virginia, Section 101.
24 Whealton v. Doughty, 112 Va. 649, 72 S.E. 112 (1911).
25 French v. Williams, 82 Va. 462, 4 S.E. 591 (1887); Midkiff v. Glass, 139
Va. 218, 123 S.E. 329 (1924).
26 Cox, Titles to Land in Virginia, Section 101.
27 Merritt v. Bunting, 107 Va. 174, 57 S.E. 567 (1907).
28 2 Minor, Real Property, § 1076 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
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(c) By reference to a recorded map, plat survey, deed or
other writing.29
(d) By number or letter on a recorded subdivision.3"
(e) By house number and named street where there is an
established plan of numbering. 3'
(f) By any name by which the land is generally known
and can be identified.
3 2
(g) As occupied by or acquired by a named person at a
definite time.33
(h) As being all the land of the grantor in a designated
place or acquired in a specific way.34
Construction of the description should carry out the intent of
the parties, and in case of conflict between different parts of the
description, the intent of the parties will govern. If the intent cannot
be ascertained, the order of preference given to methods of descrip-
tion is:35
(1) Natural monuments and landmarks.
(2) Artificial monuments and established lines, marked
and surveyed.
(3) Adjacent boundaries or lines of adjoining land.
(4) Calls for courses and distances.
(5) Measure and quantity.
29 Mathews v. Gillespie, 137 Va. 639, 120 S.E. 324 (1923); Richardson v.
Hoskins Lumber Co., 111 Va. 755, 69 S.E. 935 (1911).
30 2 Minor, Real Property, § 1075 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
31 2 Minor, Real Property, §1077 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also Harper
v. Wallerstein, 122 Va. 274, 94 S.E. 781 (1918); 4 Va. Law Reg.
(NS) 177.
32 2 Minor, Real Property, §1073 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
33 Cox, Titles to Land in Virginia, Section 101.
34 2 Minor, Real Property, §1788 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also Florence
v. Morien, 98 Va. 26, 34 S.E. 890 (1900).
35 2 Minor, Real Property, §§1072-1079 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also
Cox, Titles to Land in Virginia, Section 101; Whitehead v. Ragan,
106 Mo. 231, 17 S.W. 307 (1891); Whitehead v. Atchison, 136 Mo.
485, 37 S.W. 928 (1896).
(5) Conclusion:
The conclusion is comprised of the signatures and seals of
the parties thereto with an affirmation clause substantially similar
to, "Witness the following signature and seal."'36
In Virginia it seems that signing the deed is indispensable to its
validity. The signature, however, may be made by adopting one
written by another, or by making a mark, or by impressing some
other sign or symbol on the paper by which the signature may be
identified.3 7 An actual seal is unnecessary since if a person or part-
nership makes a writing, and in the body refers to the writing as a
deed or indenture, or uses other words importing a sealed instru-
ment, the writing shall be considered to be actually sealed by the
person or partnership, although no seal or scroll be actually at-
tached.3 8
Corporate acts must be done under the fixed corporate seal; 39
therefore, a different rule applies to corporations and natural per-
sons with respect to affixing scrolls and seals. A natural person may
affix a scroll as his seal,40 but a corporation is not permitted to
follow this practice. 41
(6) Acknowledgement:
Acknowledgements may be made by the clerk of the cir-
cuit court, corporation court of any city other than the city of Rich-
mond, Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, or any court of
record within the United States or Porto Rico or any dependency
or territory or possession of the United States, or his deputy; a com-
missioner in chancery, justice of the peace or notary public. Ac-
knowledgement may also be made in foreign countries by the desig-
nated United States government officer or foreign officer.42 Ac-
knowledgement is necessary for recordation but not to pass title.
36 2 Minor, Real Property, §1059 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
3 2 Minor, Real Property, § 1062 and footnote (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
3 8 Va. Code §11-3 (1950). See 2 Minor, Real Property, §1064 (2d Ed.
Ribble, 1928) for statutory doctrine in Virginia as to nature of seal.
39 The Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 29 S.E. 2d 406 (1944).
40 Va. Code §11-3 (1950).
41 2 Minor, Real Property, § 1064 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
42 Va. Code §55-114 (1950).
"Title passes by execution and delivery of the deed." 43 Where the
acknowledgement of a deed is void, the recordation is invalid, and
as a result the attorney should be extremely cautious in checking
the date of expiration of the notary public's commission.
Delivery, Acceptance and Recordation.
Delivery:
Delivery is an indispensable requisite of the validity of a
deed; it may be actual or constructive, and fundamentally depends
upon the intent of the parties. 44 "Intent" does not mean that the
grantor must give directly to the grantee-he may give to a third
party, not to be delivered to the grantee until the happening of an
uncertain event. This constitutes conditional delivery, or delivery in
escrow, and no estate will vest in the grantee until the condition is
satisfied. It has been held in Virginia that delivery in escrow may
be made by the grantor directly to the grantee." 5
Acceptance:
Acceptance by the grantee is necessary to the validity of
the deed, since it is apparant that no grantor may force his prop-
erty upon an unwilling grantee. If the grantee refuses to accept, it
is not a perfected deed and passes no title. There does not have
to be express acceptance however, as "the law naturally presumes
that every estate is beneficial to the party to whom it is given, and
therefore that he assents to it until and unless he renounces it.' 6
P. G. D.
3-WILLS
With the exception of the family of deeds, title to more real
property appears to be transferred by means of wills than by any
other form of instrument. Wills represent a unique class of instru-
43 Peatross v. Gray, 181 Va. 847, 861, 27 S.E. 2d 203, 210 (1943).
44 2 Minor, Real Property, §§1065-1068 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
45 Barnett v. Rhudy, 137 Va. 67, 119 S.E. 97 (1923); Whitaker v. Lane,
128 Va. 317, 104 S.E. 252, '11 ALR 1157 (1920). Accord, Lerner
Shops of North Carolina Inc. v. Rosenthal, 225 N.C. 316, 34 S.E. 2d
206 (1945).
46 2 Minor, Real Property, §1027 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also Skipwith
v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh (35 Va.) 271, 281 (1837).
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ments to which the practitioner's knowledge of the law regarding
deeds has little application. The unusual element presenting itself
when a will is found in the chain of the title has to do with the fact
that, unlike the relatively self-sufficient deed, the will is, for a time,
subject to a multitude of influences calculated to modify its effect or
to invalidate it entirely.
Normally, the presence of a will in the chain is indicated by a
reference in a subsequent deed, or it is suspected when the searcher
is unable to locate a particular grantor in a prior capacity as
grantee in a deed. In this latter case other possibilities exist, such as
passage of title by intestate succession, but for our purposes, a will
will be assumed to exist. Wills are normally recorded in the will
book in the Clerk's Office of the county where the land in question
is situated." In this connection it should be noted that the probate
procedure is available for properly authenticated copies of wills
executed in another state and that, when so probated, the foreign
will is effective in transferring title to local real property of the
decedent if it was so executed as to be a valid will of real estate as
measured against the Virginia requirements. 2 A major difficulty is
presented by the fact that the will book is indexed by the testator's
name and not by the devisee's name. Thus, unless the search can
ascertain the name of the decedent from whose estate the last-found
grantor took title, the only means of locating this grantor in a
capacity as devisee lies in an unguided, general search through the
will book. As will appear, this search may have to cover an ex-
tremely broad span of time and, in all likelihood, will not be
feasible. As a means of reducing this burden an obvious approach
which suggests itself is that the title examiner look for a testator
whose name is the same as that of the last-found grantor. If this is
unsuccessful, it will be necessary to turn to other local sources of
information in an effort to obtain clues to the identity of the un-
known testator.3
'Va. Code §§17-63, 64-73, 64-90 (1950). Observe that the will is effective
without probate, but that to be protected from purchasers from the
decedent's heirs it is essential that the purchaser under a will insure
that it be probated and recorded. To this effect see: 2 Minor, Real
Property, §1187 (2d. Ed. Ribble, 1928); Va. Code §64-91 (1950).
2Va. Code §64-88 (1950). See Horn v. Horn, 195 Va. 912, 81 S.E. 2d 593
(1954).
3 Note the additional difficulties which may be involved for the examiner if
the will is one originally probated in a foreign jurisdiction where he is
not familiar with local affairs.
Although the name of the testator will be the primary objective
of this collateral search, it is also very desirable to ascertain the
date of his death, or better still, the time at which his will was pro-
bated. This is because, even though the name is known, the un-
located will may have been probated at any point within the very
wide span of time and, without a date upon which to rely, the
searcher may have to do an appreciable amount of unnecessary
work in locating it. This time period normally begins, at the
earliest, with the date at which the last-found grantor conveyed the
property.' From this point it would appear to extend back into
time, in theory at least, to a date to be computed, if at all, by the
determining of the most distant point in time prior to the grantor's
birth date at which application of the "Rule Against Perpetuities"
would have permitted the probate of a will vesting an interest in
land in futuro. In other words, the grantor's interest in the property
is required by the rule to have vested within a certain prescribed
period s and reverse application of this concept, starting with his
birth date, should indicate the most remote time at which a will
vesting an estate in him could have qualified for probate. As a
practical matter, it is impossible to compute this period with any
degree of accuracy. Knowledge of the concept, however, should be
valuable in that it keeps before the examiner the full potential ex-
tent of a thorough will search. It may well be that the customary
search of local attorneys is less extensive than has been indicated by
the foregoing and that, in the average situation, the examiner may
be able to reduce his activities accordingly. 6
If a will cannot be located, the next step will presumably be to
initiate a search for some other form of conveyance. Assuming that
this is not successful, the recordation to the client will be based
upon this fact as evaluated in the light of all of the circumstances.
If a will is located, other problems are then presented.
As suggested previously, a will standing alone is often a poor
risk insofar as it provides any solid assurance as to the state of the
4 The will could have been probated after he made his deed. This later
acquisition of the property involves the problem of estoppel by deed.
For a discussion of the Virginia law on this subject, see Section 1,
supra, Mechanics of a Title Examination.
5 Generally stated as: "A life or lives in being plus twenty-one years plus a
period of gestation (ten months). Obviously, an extended period of
time may be involved. See 2 Minor, Real Property, §809 (2d Ed. Ribble,
1928).
6See Section 9 Appendix of Forms, infra.
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title to a piece of real estate. Of course, its weaknesses may be cured
to all intents and purposes by the passage of extended periods of
time. However, as will be seen, there is a period during which its
susceptibility to attack and effective modification by external in-
fluences will be of critical importance.
The first general area of instability is primarily applicable to
wills of recent date-perhaps so recent as the will under which the
would-be vendor with whom you are dealing took the property.
This is the type of attack in which the validity of the will and its
proper execution are in question. Typical situations are those in
which the attempt to establish conclusively a will by means of the
probate procedure is contested on the grounds that undue influence
was exerted upon the testator; that the testator was mistaken as to
the nature of the instrument which he signed; that he lacked the
requisite capacity to make a will (either in that he did not have the
mental capacity necessary or that he did not meet the prescribed
statutory requirements7 ); that the testator was misledin drawing
the will by the fraudulent acts of some interested party or that the
will is invalid due to some mechanical or procedural error in its
preparation. The will may also be wholly invalid by reason of a
later-dated, revoking will, or by reason of the subsequent marriage
of the testator. Initiation of most of these actions is confined by
statute to a period of one year following the date on which the
purported will was finally admitted to probate" with certain excep-
tions created to protect the interests of persons under disabilities. 9
Once these periods have run, the will, having been officially pro-
bated, is thus established as the true last will and testament of the
decedent and is no longer subject to a true attack on that basis."0
Because it has the effect of an attack, qualification of this statement
must be made in order to cover the case of a later-found, subse-
quently-dated will. This later-found will can be admitted to probate
at any time inasmuch as no period of limitation runs against it. The
time limit upon attacks on the previously probated "will" is not
7 See Va. Code §§6448, 64-49 (1950), and annotations thereto.
8 See Va. Code §64-74 (1910) (Appeal from order of clerk admitting will to
probate; §64-80 (Effect of Judgment in the preceding proceedings);
§64-84 (Bill in equity to establish or impeach will probated in ex parte
proceedings and not appealed by parties) ; §64-85 (Period of limitation
restricting exercise of rights under §64-84).
9 Va. Code §64-86 (1950).
10 Va. Code §§64-74, 64-85 (1950).
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invoked because it is reasoned that the admission to probate of the
subsequent will is merely a recognition of the true state of affairs
and is not an attack within the meaning of the statute."' The
drastic possibility that a contradictory, later-dated will may appear
some day to defeat the rights of the purchaser is minimized some-
what by a statutory provision to the effect that no will submitted
for probate more than one year from the date of testator's death
shall affect the title of a bona fide purchaser of real estate from a
devisee (or heir) of decedent.' 2 Again, the effect of these provisions
is diminished by the fact that a saving feature is incorporated which
protects persons under the disabilities of insanity or infancy in their
right to assert their interests under this later will until one year has
elapsed subsequent to removal of their disabilities.13 If the attorney
for the prospective purchaser can establish the identity of persons
in these protected classes and can satisfactorily bind them so as to
protect his client, the statutes appear to be beneficial. It is, however,
easy to visualize a situation in which the identity of the persons
having outstanding rights will be virtually impossible to ascertain.
Since this is a situation in which, in order for the purchaser to be
adversely affected, it is necessary that a later-dated will be found
and that one or more of the devisees named in that will be a person
under a disability, the statistical improbability that such a combina-
tion of circumstances will come to pass is to be considered and,
depending upon the nature of the use and the value of the land,
may or may not be sufficient justification for disregarding this po-
tential event. A somewhat similar situation may arise where a per-
son presumed dead by reason of the absence of seven years re-
appears after his will has been probated and his estate administered.
Here, however, a statute provides protection for the bona fide pur-
chaser under the previously probated will.' 4
A second type of problem is presented by the existence of cer-
tain statutory rights which take precedence in the distribution of a
decedent's estate even as to the rights of specific devisees named in
a valid, probated will. Among these are included such interests as
the surviving spouse's right to dower or curtesy; the rights of cred-
itors of the decedent or of his estate; the homestead exemption in
31 In re Will of Bently, 175 Va. 456, 9 S.E. 2d 308 (1940).
'1 Va. Code §§64-91 and 64-92 (1950).
'3 Ibid.
3 4 Va. Code §64-109 (1950).
favor of the surviving spouse and/or children; certain tax claims
and the rights of the pretermitted child. In some of these cases, as
with creditors' claims, 5 there are limitation periods which afford a
measure of protection for the purchaser of real estate. In others the
only safeguard lies in careful detective work or in the effects of the
passage of time from which, for example, it can be assumed that a
surviving spouse is no longer living.' 6
The third and least definable area of uncertainty arises when
the attorney searching a title must determine for himself just what
estate, if any, was passed by a will and to whom. Examples of this
type of difficulty will occur frequently when the will under consid-
eration is of recent date and the estate passing under it is still being
administered although similar problems can arise under an older
will.
A typical situation is where a devisee is given a particularly
desirable property in which your client is interested. Under these
circumstances, it may well devolve upon the title examiner to
analyze the will, the procedure by which it was executed and is being
administered and the related circumstances which have to be con-
sidered in order to determine the operative effect of the will."7 All
of this must be done with the objective of determining the effect
of the will; of anticipating the likelihood that the personal repre-
sentative may have to submit some questionable part of the will in
which the examiner is interested to the court for interpretation and
15 Va. Code §§8-142, 8-143, 64-173 (1950). "The effect of the statutes is
interpreted to be the creation of a quasi-lien on decedent's real property
for a period of one year subsequent to his death. During this period
there can be no such thing as a bona fide purchaser of the real estate."
Also: "After the expiration of that time, the creditor is remitted to his
rights under the other provisions of the section which declare that:
'the estate conveyed shall not be liable, if the conveyance was bona
fide, and at the time of such conveyance no suit shall have been com-
menced for the administration of such assets, nor any report have been
filed as aforesaid of the debts and demands of those entitled,' and even
a pending suit would not preserve the right of such creditor as against
a bona fide purchaser, unless a lis pendens was docketed as required
by Va. Code §8-42 (1950)." Heeke v. Allan, 127 Va. 65, 70, 102 S.E.
655, 656 (1920).
16 Being a life interest, the consummate interest of the surviving spouse is
terminated at death even though it may have been assigned to another.
13 The problems are more complex when the will is one originally probated
in a remote jurisdiction. This is because of the greater difficulties in
learning anything about the surrounding circumstances where the exam-
iner is not a local citizen.
if it is concluded that this is likely, of anticipating the decision of
the court. This represents an extreme example, but does point up
the fact that in dealing with wills in the chain of title, it will gen-
erally be necessary to have an adequate knowledge of the law of
wills. Knowledge of the order in which gifts by will abate in order
that funds may be available for the payment of creditors' pri-
ority claims is typical of the type of information which will be re-
quired in order to properly evaluate the status of a parcel of real
estate.
Similar problems of interpretation arise under older wills, for
instance, the last-found grantor may have indicated that he was
conveying an estate in fee. The will under which he took may, in
unclear terms, present him with a life interest and another person
with the remainder in fee. Worse still, this other person may be
or may have been aware of this situation and may have acted ac-
cordingly in that he too has made conveyances. It is the duty of the
title examiner to ascertain what interest was devised to whom, and
to make appropriate recommendations1 s
F. V. E.
4-UNRECORDED INTERESTS
Conveyances of real estate which are not recorded are void as
to all purchasers for valuable consideration without notice." The
reason for this rule is to give purchasers notice of encumbrances on
property.2 Recordation, in effect, is constructive notice of all prior,
recorded interests in the property.
Certain unrecorded rights in land may, in spite of the recordation
statute, defeat the interests of subsequent purchasers. In many
instances such rights, by their nature, are incapable of being
recorded; in other instances recordation may not be required
immediately upon transfer, thus leaving a period of time in which
28 Since the title to property passed by will vests immediately in the devisee
subject to his divesting himself of it, it would appear that no applica-
tion of res-adjudicata is involved and that until barred by the general
statutes of limitation, the rightful devisee can assert his interest at any
time. See 2 Minor, Real Property, §1155 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
'Va. Code §55-96 (1950).
2 McCormack v. Jamhes, 36 F. 14 (1886).
a purchaser is given no record notice. In fact, recordation in some
instances is not required at all.
The rights of a subsequent purchaser are generally defeated if
he has actual or constructive notice of prior interests in the land.
While recordation is, by statute, constructive notice of prior, re-
corded interests in land, the common law doctrine of constructive
notice is applied to most interests which are unrecordable or are not
required to be recorded. Hence, the effect given the doctrine of
constructive notice by judicial decision is of primary importance in
Virginia.
Constructive Notice-Inquiry Notice
Constructive notice has been defined as "evidence of notice, the
presumptions of which are so violent that they may not be con-
troverted."
It has been held that to affect a party with constructive notice of
the fact with which he is sought to be charged, he must have had
knowledge of facts naturally calculated to excite suspicion in the
mind of a person of ordinary care and prudence. 4 Mere suspicion
which incites inquiry is insufficient. The circumstances which give
rise to constructive notice must be clear and strong, and such as to
impute bad faith to a purchaser in his failure to heed them.5 The
general test appears to be that the facts in question were so clear
and strong, imputing bad faith, and of such overwhelming evi-
dentiary value that they will not be controverted by the courts.
In Virginia those circumstances sufficient to put a person of
common prudence and ordinary diligence and experience upon
inquiry will charge him with actual knowledge of those facts which
an inquiry would have disclosed.6
The broad conclusion from these considerations of the doctrines
of constructive notice and inquiry notice is that a purchaser is held
merely to a comfortable standard or duty in ascertaining prior,
adverse interests in land-that of ordinary diligence as it may be
3 2 Minor, Real Property, §1318 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
4 Great Atlantic, etc., Tea Co. v. Cofer, 129 Va. 640, 106 S.E. 695 (1921).
5 Hutton v. Wood, 101 Va. 54, 43 S.E. 186 (1902).
6 Fisher v. Borden, 111 Va. 535, 69 S.E. 636 (1910).
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incited to inquiry by definite and clear facts. By this test, if it
were the only test, a purchaser could forego all conscious effort to
discover unrecorded interests affecting his title and suffer no loss
in most of his purchases. If it were not for the doctrine of inquiry
notice, a purchaser would frequently be placed in a better position
by his failure to investigate the possibility of unrecorded interests
than by a bona fide attempt to disclose them. It has been held,
however, that one who purposely abstains from inquiry to avoid
notice or fails to obtain it by gross negligence will be charged with
notice.7 In every conveyance there is a possibility that title will
prove defective as a result of some unrecorded interest which is
overlooked and of which the purchaser has constructive notice.
The conveyancer should direct his client-purchaser to these pos-
sibilities in the report of his search of title.8
Easements-Adverse Possession-
Possession By The Grantor
Unrecorded easements are typical of that class of interests which
are unrecordable by their nature. They may be created by impli-
cation, estoppel or prescription.9 They will prevail over the interest
acquired by a subsequent purchaser only if he purchases with
actual notice of the easement or at the time of purchase was
cognizant of such facts as would give him constructive notice of
the easement.1 0
It is a well-established principle governing the pur-
chase of servient tenements that an easement therein is
extinguished unless the purchaser has either actual notice
of the existence of the easement, or constructive notice
from the recordation of the express grant or reservation
creating it, or from the fact that its use and enjoyment is
open and visible.:" In order for the purchaser to be
charged with constructive notice of an easement by other
than recordation, the use and enjoyment of the easement
must be apparent, visible and continuous.'2
7 Fisher v. Lee, 98 Va. 159, 35 S.E. 441 (1900).
s See Section 9, Appendix of Forms, infra.
9 1 Minor, op. cit. supra, §§97-105.
0 Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 83 S.E. 393 (1914).
"1 1 Minor, op. cit. supra, §113.
72 Hammond v. Ryman, 120 Va. 13, 90 S.E. 613 (1916).
Interests' arising by adverse possession are closely related to
easements created by prescription. Both are unrecordable interests
distinguished by the nature of the interests acquired-only interests
in incorporeal property may be created by prescription while
adverse possession gives title to tangible property. 13 Easements by
prescription are acquired by the "lost grant" fiction by which,
after the peaceful enjoyment of an interest for a long period of
time, the enjoyment is presumed to be founded upon a lost grant.
Title by adverse possession, on the other hand, is acquired by the
acquiescence of the original owner in a notorious possession which
is adverse to his own."4 While prescriptive easements will be en-
forced against a subsequent purchaser only if the easement was
apparent and visible,15 adverse possession vests title in the possessor
which is paramount to and good against that of all other persons,
no matter how or when such other title was obtained or asserted. 6
Since their use and enjoyment must be apparent and visible, the
circumstances are usually such as to justify a finding of constructive
notice of the existence of prescriptive easements.17 Although pos-
session by a claimant under the doctrine of adverse possession must
be notorious, justifying a similar finding of constructive notice, the
enforcement of his claim is unlimited, and title by adverse pos-
session is absolute.
Since interests which arise by easements and adverse possession
are, as a rule, discerned by an inspection of the premises, the
conveyancer should advise his clients of their nature and suggest
an inspection designed to disclose them.
Effect of Quitclaim Deed
Frequently the rights of a purchaser are determined by more
specific tests than that provided by the general doctrine of con-
structive notice.
The grantee under a quitclaim deed takes in subordination to
claimants by prior unrecorded deeds since the grantee in a quit-
23 2 Minor, op. cit. supra, §984.
24 Ibid.
Is 1 Minor, op. cit. supra, §113.
16 McCanahan v. N. & W., 112 Va. 705, 96 S.E. 453 (1911).
17 Burby, Real Property, (Hornbook Series), 116 (1943).
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claim deed is not considered a bona fide purchaser within the
meaning of the Virginia recording acts."' This rule is based upon
the theory that the purchaser is charged with notice of outstanding
claims since a quitclaim deed only purports to convey the grantor's
interest.' 9
Only if the grantee were the first to receive and record the whole
interest by quitclaim is he considered a bona fide purchaser.20 In
this situation the claimant by quitclaim gains good title-his re-
cordation of the quitclaim provides notice to subsequent purchasers
and forecloses the assertion of prior unrecorded deeds.
Death of Landowner
If the owner of land dies intestate in Virginia, his realty passes
directly to his heirs by operation of law. This interest is unrecorded
and vests immediately in the heirs. 21 Since the title to such land
does not pass through the decedent's estate, no interest therein
is obtained by a purchaser from the administrator of the estate.
It should be noted that in Virginia an heir includes issue born
within ten months of the father's death. 2
If a landowner dies testate his will need not be admitted to
probate until one year after his death.28 Within this period no
adverse interest may be acquired in the land.
An existing will will be re-opened if adoption of a child2" or
birth of a child after the date of the will occurs. 25
Errors in Recordation
Except for the period between 1919 and 1922 the grantor-grantee
indexes have not been part of the record in Virginia. 26 Hence, it
Is Virginia and Tennessee Coal & Iron Co. v. Fields, 94 Va. 102, 20 S.E.
426 (1896). For a more complete discussion of the effect of quitclaim
deeds see 32 Va. L. Rev. 190 (1945).
19 Tiffany, Real Property, p. 1091 (1912).
20 Clark v. Sayers, 55 Va. 512, 47 S.E. 312 (1904).
21 Broaddus v. Broaddus, 144 Va. 727, 130 S.9. 794 (1925).
22 Va. Code §§64-8, 64-69 and 64-70 (1950).
2 3 Va. Code §64-91 (1950).
24 2 Minor, op. cit. supra, §926.
25Id. at §1178.
2 6 Jones v. Folks, 149 Va. 140, 140 S.9. 126 (1927).
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is technically necessary for a search of title to include an examina-
tion of each deed book. Any omission or error in entering a
conveyance in the indexes will not prevent a subsequent purchaser
from being charged with notice from other books of record.2 7
Errors which appear in the deed of conveyance will defeat the
effect of recordation as notice, however, unless the property is so
described and identified that a subsequent purchaser would, by
the description, be given a means to determine all adverse rights
which were intended to be created by the deed. 28 In case of error
in the record itself, marginal corrections are part of the record
and will constitute notice of the interest as correctly set forth in
such corrections. 29
Periods During Which Recordation Not Required
A. Condemnation Proceedings
When land has been made the subject of condemnation pro-
ceedings action thereunder is only required to be immediately
recorded in the county where most of the land is located. The
condemnation of portions of the same lands situated in other
counties is not required to be recorded until the proceedings are
completed.30 When the proceedings are completed title to all
condemned lands vests in accordance with the directions of the
court. No interest therein may be acquired by one who purchases
prior to recordation. It has been held in Virginia that the con-
demnation proceeding itself provides notice of a prior right in all
the land affected. 3
B. Leases
A lease for five years, or less, is not required to be recorded
or in writing if the lessee takes possession of the premises.3 2 Such
a lease is valid against an innocent purchaser for value of the
premises. 8
27 2 Minor, op. cit. supra, § 1308.
28 Merritt v. Bunting, 107 Va. 174, 57 S.E. 567 (1907).
29 Blair v. Rorer, 135 Va. 1, 116 S.E. 767 (1923).
so Va. Code §§25-2 and 25-38 (1950).
31 Robinson v. Crenshaw, 84 Va. 348, 5 S.E. 222 (1888).
32 Smith v. Payne, 153 Va. 746, 151 S.E. 295 (1930).
33 Great Atlantic, etc., Tea Co. v. Cofer, 129 Va. 640, 106 S.9. 695 (1921).
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Breach of Condition Subsequent
Although. there appears to be no case in point, it is provided in
Virginia that "Any person who shall have a right of re-entry into
lands by reason.., of the breach of any... condition subsequent,
may serve a declaration in ejectment on the tenant in possession
.... "" The phrase "tenant in possession" logically includes
purchasers from the grantee. The grantor of land is thus enabled
to maintain an action of ejectment against his grantee's purchaser
even though such purchaser bought the premises without knowl-
edge of a breach of the condition.
West Virginia decisions tend to support this view except that
that jurisdiction distinguishes express from implied conditions. The
grantor's right of re-entry prevails in the case of express conditions
but is subordinated to the interests of the grantee's purchaser in
the case of implied conditions. 5 While such a distinction might




A judgment lien is defined as a lien of a statutory nature cre-
ated by the judgment itself which is placed upon the real property
of the judgment debtor." The judgment lien is of purely statutory
origin for a judgment at common law imposed no lien whatsoever
upon the realty of the judgment debtor, and the lands of a judg-
ment debtor could not be seized to satisfy a judgment unless the
judgment was in favor of the king In 1285, a statute2 was passed
whereby an election was allowed to the judgment creditor to sue out
a writ commanding the sheriff to make the debt or the damages
from the goods or chattels of the debtor or to deliver to the creditor
all the chattels of the debtor with certain exceptions and a moiety of
his land until the debt should be satisfied. The former method was
accomplished by a writ of fieri facias; the latter alternative came
4 Va. Code §55-239 (1950).
35 1 Minor, op. cit. supra, §519.
1 Ballantine Law Dictionary, 2d Ed., 1948.
2 West. II, 13 Edw. I, ch. 18 (1285).
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to be nominated an elegit since it required an election of the judg-
ment creditor that the lands of the judgment debtor be subjected to
the payment of the debt. The lien created by the writ of elegit was
incidental to it and dependent upon it for its existence. The writ of
elegit has been abolished in Virginia.3
Today in Virginia the judgment rendered against a defendant
creates a legal statutory lien on all the real property of the judg-
ment debtor.4 Although the judgment creates the lien, it is neces-
sary that it be docketed with the clerk of the court in the city or
county where the land is situated before it will be considered per-
fected against a purchaser for valuable consideration without
notice.5 The lien includes not only the real property of which the
judgment debtor is possessed as of the date of judgment, but it
includes any real property that he becomes entitled to or possessed
of after the date fixed by the statute for the commencement of the
lien. It is of considerable importance to note that the judgment
creditor is not to be treated as a purchaser in any sense but acquires
only a lien on whatever interest the judgment debtor had in the
estate unless there is a statutory enactment which makes the cred-
itor's interest paramount. Therefore if a parcel of real estate is held
by a judgment debtor in trust for another, the beneficial interest in
such third party would be superior to the rights of the judgment
creditor.6
The lien attaches not only to the legal estate of the judgment
3 Va. Code §8-400 (1950).
4 Va. Code §8-386 (1950). Every judgement rendered in this State by any
state or federal court, other than by confession in vacation, shall be a
lien on all the real estate of or to which the defendant in the judgment
is or becomes possessed or entitled, at or after the date of the judgment,
or if it was rendered in court, at or after the commencement of the
term at which it was so rendered, if the cause was in such condition
that a judgment might have been rendered on the first day of the
term. But if from the nature of the case judgment could not have been
rendered at the commencement of the term, it shall be a lien only on
or after the date on which the judgment or decree is rendered; provided,
however, that the foregoing shall not prevent the lien of a judgment or
decree from relating back to the first day of the term merely because
the case is set for trial or hearing on a later day of the term, if the
case was matured and ready for hearing at the commencement of the
term.
5 Va. Code §8-390 (1950).
6 Dingus et al v. Minneapolis Improvement Company, et al, 98 Va. 737, 37
S.E. 353 (1900).
debtor but also to any equitable interest that he may have in real
property. Under this reasoning, the equity of redemption is subject
to the lien, as is also a contingent remainder at the moment that it
becomes vested.7 A lease for a term of years is regarded as a chattel
real subject to a writ of execution, and therefore not land that will
be bound by the judgment. Contracts for the sale of land create in
the vendee an equitable interest in the land by the process of equi-
table conversion. A Court of equity regards the vendee as having
acquired property in the land and the vendor as having acquired
property in the price. The vendee may devise or encumber it; if he
dies intestate, it passes to his heirs at law. His wife is entitled to
dower in it, and specific performance may be enforced against his
heirs.8 This is an equitable doctrine and does not determine all legal
rights, for a judgment against the vendor which is docketed before
his conveyance to the vendee is recorded continues to be a lien
upon the land. 9 In order for the contract for the sale of land to con-
stitute notice to both purchasers and creditors, it must be record-
ed'0 in the office of the clerk of the court of the county wherein the
real estate lies; if it is situated in more than one county or corpora-
tion, recordation must be made in each such county or corpora-
tion.11 The contract for such sale of land is recorded in the deed
book.12 An exception to be noted is the situation which arises when
the purchase money is paid by one person with the title taken in
another. In this instance, it has been held that the title holder is a
mere trustee with no beneficial interest in the property, and the
land is not bound by a judgment against him." n
The Virginia statute prescribing the time for the commence-
ment of the lien provides that a judgment rendered in a court for
money constitutes a lien on all the real property of the judgment
debtor when it is recorded in the clerk's office of the court of the
county or corporation wherein the land is located. It is further pro-
vided that such lien is to run from the first day of the term of court
at which the judgment was rendered if there could have been a
7 Wilson v. Langhorne, 102 Va. 631, 47 S.E. 871 (1904).
8 Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 120 S.E. 870 (1924).
9 Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. 178, 160 S.E. 203 (1931).
'
0 Va. Code §55-96 (1950).
11Va. Code §55-97 (1950).
12Va. Code §55-95 (1950).
13 Stratley v. Esser, 117 Va. 135, 83 S.E. 1075 (1915).
judgment rendered on that day." The interpretation placed upon
this statute by the Supreme Court of Appeals is that if the case was
ready for trial on the first day of the term at which it was rendered,
the lien is to run from that date; otherwise, it will attach from the
date that it was rendered.' 5 There is a question in Virginia today
whether or not this statute has any effect. Courts of record in
Virginia now have continuing terms. Under this interpretation, it
would seem to be impossible to say which is the first day of the term.
Therefore it is uncertain whether a judgment placing a lien upon
the real property of the judgment debtor would relate back.
A further point to be noted is the application of Rule 3:2116
which allows the trial court to notify or vacate a judgment within
twenty-one days after the entry thereof. The problem in this con-
nection is what would be the result if the day after the judgment is
rendered and recorded, the judgment creditor brings a suit to
foreclose his lien? One way to solve this dilemma is to interpret
Rule 3:21 as having the effect of postponing the bringing of the suit.
It is doubtful that a court of equity would entertain a suit to fore-
close the judgment lien within the twenty-one day period after the
entry of the judgment when it is provided by statute17 that the
clerk of court is not to issue a writ of fieri facias. Since the purpose
of both the judgment lien and the writ of fieri facias is to collect a
money judgment, and both are interrelated insofar as the statute
of limitations is concerned, it is submitted that the better result
would be not to entertain such a suit until the expiration of the
twenty-one day period when the trial court loses all jurisdiction.' 8
Applying this reasoning to the doctrine of relation back, it would
follow that since there are no terms of court as such, the doctrine
would have no application further back than twenty-one days from
the time the judgment became final. Therefore the judgment would
become a lien as of the date that it is rendered.
With either this reasoning or applying the presently used doc-
trine of relation back, the subsequent purchaser will take prece-
dence over a lien creditor who has failed to record. Virginia has
14 Va. Code §8-386 (1950).
"5 Yates v. Robertson, 80 Va. 475 (1885).
16 Rules of Court, 1950.
17 Va. Code §8-399 (1950).
Is Harvey v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 198 Va. 213, 93 S.E.
2d 309 (1956).
what may be characterized as a "race-notice" statute1 9 as concerns
mortgages and deeds of trust. By this is meant that whichever party
records first has the superior right as far as the land is concerned,
provided that he did not have actual notice previous to that time.
In other matters, Virginia has a "notice" statute. Once the judg-
ment or the conveyance has been recorded, it constitutes construc-
tive notice to all the world as to an encumbrance or a conveyance.
A judgment creditor will be accorded priority against a purchaser
who has failed to record even though the purchaser has entered
upon the land and is making improvements. 20 It has been held that
possession in Virginia is not sufficient notice to put a subsequent
purchaser on inquiry.21 The result would be the same although the
judgment creditor had actual notice of the conveyance provided
that the purchaser had failed to record.2 2 If, however, the convey-
ance-is recorded prior to the rendering of the judgment, the date of
the commencement of the lien is immaterial for rights of a third
party have intervened. 23 If the judgment is confessed, the lien dates
from the time of day that it is confessed. The time of confession is
the controlling factor and not the time that the ministerial act of
recordation is performed by the clerk.24 This has no application to
a purchaser for value without notice who would have priority
against an undocketed judgment.
The object and purpose of docketing a judgment is to give the
required notice to subsequent purchasers for value. The docketing
of a judgment gives no preference among creditors. Priority among
the various creditors is fixed as of the date of judgment. 23 As to
subsequent purchasers for value without notice, it is required by
statute 211 that the judgment be indexed in the judgment lien book
before it is considered to be docketed. This varies the procedure
from that required for a purchaser to be protected from a prior in-
consistent conveyance. In that instance it is sufficient if the deed
19 Va. Code §55-96 (1950).
20 Flannary v. Kane, 102 Va. 547, 46 S.E. 312 (1904).
21 Thomas v. Lee, 144 Va. 523, 132 S.E. 307 (1926).
22 Flannary v. Kane, supra.
23 1 Minor, Real Property, §665 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928).
24American Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank of Suffolk, 170 Va. 169,
196 S.E. 693 (1938).
25 Gurnee v. Johnson, 77 Va. 712 (1883).
26 Va. Code §8-378 (1950).
has been delivered to the clerk of the court. Recordation is con-
sidered a ministerial duty and the grantee is protected if the deed
is duly admitted to record by the clerk of the court wherein the
land is situated without indexing it. When indexing a judgment,
initials may be used instead of the full name. Whether or not the
omission of a middle initial in the index will invalidate a judgment
lien is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. If
the name that is used is sufficient to put a reasonable man on
notice, an omission will not be fatal to the lien. It has been held in
Virginia that a judgment docketed in the name of Mrs. T. Frank
Simmons will not constitute notice to a purchaser for value of prop-
erty from Mrs. May M. Simmons even though she is the same per-
son. 27 When examining the judgment lien, it is not necessary that
one search every possible designation of the person whose title he is
examining. The title examiner must search the name as it is ordi-
narily used by its possessor. The omission of a Christian name is
fatal to the lien.2
When the judgment has been docketed, the judgment creditor
acquires the right to subject the land of the judgment debtor to
the satisfaction of his lien. The condition in which the creditor
finds the property at the time of the enforcement of the lien is
the controlling factor. There is no allowance made for any im-
provements placed upon the land by a purchaser subsequent to
the docketing of the judgment since the statute2" providing for
such an allowance has no application. The reasoning behind this
rule is that the purchaser has constructive notice of such a lien,
and therefore the judgment creditor is free to subject both the
land and the improvements to the satisfaction of his judgment.30
Against judgment creditors of the debtor, the unrecorded con-
veyance is a nullity, and both the land and the subsequent im-
provements are subject to the lien. Until the judgment has been
recorded, it is void as against a subsequent purchaser for value
without notice. It has been held in this type of situation that
2 7 Va. Law Reg. 253 (1901-1902). The case comment noted that the
entry of the judgment against Mrs. Simmons in her husband's Christian
name was done according to social rather than legal or business custom.
28 Richardson v. Gardner, 128 Va. 676, 105 S.E. 225 (1920).
29 Va. Code §8-242 (1950). But see Section 6, Mechanic's Liens, infra, for
priorities accorded to such liens.
3 0 Nixdorf v. Blount, 111 Va. 127, 68 S.E. 258 (1910).
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whoever records first, the purchaser for value or the judgment
creditor, has priority as between the parties. 1
The judgment lien endures so long as a writ of fieri facias may
be issued or a writ of scire facias for the revival of the action may
be brought. This period of time, as fixed by statute,3 2 is twenty
years. In the case of a personal representative of a decedent, a
writ of scire facias must be brought against him within five years
from the date of his qualification in order to revive a judgment
rendered against his decedent."3 The time between the death of a
decedent and the qualification is not counted as part of the
limitation if the period of time does not exceed two years. 3 ' If
the person to whom the right of action belongs is under a disability
such as infancy or insanity, the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the disability is removed provided that in no case will
it extend beyond a period of twenty years from the time that the
right of action accrued. 5 An exception to the twenty year limita-
tion statute is the provision which does not allow a suit to be
brought to enforce a lien against the lands of a judgment debtor
which have been conveyed to a grantee for value unless such a suit
is brought within ten years from the recordation of the deed from
the judgment debtor to the grantee.38
By statute,3 7 a judgment rendered in a federal court in Virginia
is accorded the same force and effect as a judgment rendered in
a Virginia court when such judgment has been docketed in the
clerk's office of the county where the land is situated. Foreign
judgments, however, have no effect outside the jurisdiction until
an action has been maintained thereon in a Virginia court. A
domestic judgment must be rendered in order to be docketed.3,
The proper method to enforce a judgment lien is to bring a bill
in equity to foreclose the lien. If it appears to the court that the
31 Fooshee v. Snavely, 58 F. 2d 772 (1931).
3 2 Va. Code §8-396 (1950).
33 Spencer v. Flannary, 104 Va. 395, 51 S.E. 849 (1905).
34 Va. Code §8-32 (1950).
35 Va. Code §8-30 (1950).
3 6 Va Code §8-393 (1950).
37 28 U.S.C. §1962.
38 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Whaley, 173 Va. 11, 3 S.E. 2d 395
(1939).
judgment will not be satisfied within five years from the rents and
profits produced by all the land subject to the lien, the court may
direct a foreclosure sale of the whole or any part of the property
in question. 9 This statute is applicable only to suits to enforce
judgment liens and has no application whatsoever to an expressed
vendor's lien. Implied vendor's liens have been abolished by
statute.4 0 To enforce a vendor's lien, the court may decree a sale





The Virginia statute concerning mechanic's liens provides:
All persons performing labor or furnishing materials, of
the value of ten dollars or more, for the construction, re-
moval, repair or improvement of any building or struc-
ture permanently annexed to the freehold . . • shall have
a lien, if perfected as hereinafter provided, upon such
building, or structure, and so much land therewith as
shall be necessary for the convenient use and enjoyment
thereof . . . for the work done and material furnished.
But when the claim is for repairs or improvements only,
no lien shall attach to the property repairedor improved
unless such repairs or improvements were ordered by the
owner, or his agent.'
Mechanics' liens are the creature of statute and were unknown
to the common law. Like all statutory liens, the statutes creating
them must be substantially complied with. However, the rule of
construction in Virginia is that they should be liberally construed,2
although there is considerable diversity of opinion as to whether
they should be liberally or strictly construed." Nevertheless, those
portions of the statute which relate to the right to the existence of
the lien should be strictly construed since they are in derogation of
39 Va. Code §8-391 (1950).
40 Ibid.
41 Neff v. Woodling, 83 Va. 432, 2 S.E. 731 (1887).
1 Va. Code §43-3 (1950).
2 1 Minor, Real Property, §684 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
3 Annotations to Va. Code §43-3 (1950).
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the common law, and this rule of construction is maintained in spite
of Section 43-154 which provides:
No inaccuracy in the memorandum field, or in the de-
scription of the property to be covered by the lien, shall
invalidate the lien, if the property can be reasonably iden-
tified by the description given and the memorandum con
forms substantially to the requirements of Sections 43-5,
43-8 and 43-10 respectively, and is not willfully false.
The labor performed or materials furnished must be either (1)
for the construction, (2) for the repair, or (3) for the improvement
of buildings or structures, and the lien does not arise in case of the
furnishing of labor or material for other purposes connected with
the land, such as cultivating the soil, planting trees, etc.5 But it has
been held that furnishing of machinery essential to a building is
within the statute.6
b) Property Affected
Property belonging to the Commonwealth or to any munici-
pality is exempt from the statute unless expressly covered by a
statute..7 But church property has been held to be included by the
statute."
If under one contract, material is to be furnished for two or
more buildings and the material for each is specified, a lien can be
taken out only against the buildings for which the material was used.
However, if the material for each building is not specified, and the
contract is not divisible as regards such material, then the lien will
be a joint lien upon all the buildings for the whole amount.9 Where
separate buildings are constructed under separate contracts no lien
can attach to all the buildings.' 0 But all machinery and apparatus
of a permanent character and essential to the purposes of the build-
'Clement v. Adams Bros-Paynes Co., 113 Va. 547, 75 S.E. 294 (1912).
5 1 Minor, Real Property, §685 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
6 Haskin Wood, etc. Co. v. Cleveland, 94 Va. 439, 26 S.E. 878 (1897).
7 Manly v. Broaddus, 94 Va. 547, 27 S.E. 438 (1897); Phillips v. University
of Va., 97 Va. 472, 34 S.E. 66 (1899).
8 Cain v. Rae, 159 Va. 446, 166 S.E. 478 (1932).
9 Sergeant v. Denby, 87 Va. 206, 12 S.E. 402 (1890).
10 Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494, 28 S.E. 875 (1898).
ing, although severable without lasting injury to it or to the build-
ings, may be subjected to a valid mechanic's lien.11
c) Estate or Interest Subject to Lien
If the person who shall cause a building or structure
to be erected or repaired owns less than a fee simple estate
in the land, then only his interest therein shall be subject
to liens created under this chapter. 2
The interest of a lessor in a lot upon which the leasee has
erected a building cannot be subjected to the liens of mechanics for
erecting the buildings unless the lessor or his duly authorized agent
caused the building to be erected.1 And if the lessee under a lease
covenants that he will erect a building on the leased land, and after
erecting the building fails to pay the contractor, the lessor, under this
section, has not "caused" the building to be erected as to allow a
mechanic's lien to foreclose his interest in the land.1 4
A personal decree may be entered against a person who, having
ordered improvements or repairs upon the land without authority,
has no interest in the land, providing he be made a party to the suit
in equity to enforce the mechanic's lien.1 5
A mechanic's lien may be perfected on an equitable as well as
on a legal estate1 6 but when entered against an equitable estate, its
value depends upon that particular estate, and it survives or per-
ishes with it."
As to prior encumbrances, if the grantor under an unrecorded
conveyance causes a building to be erected after a judgment is re-
covered against the grantor, the judgment creditor has a superior
encumbrance upon the land, to the extent of the value of the land,
and this encumbrance would take priority over a mechanic's lien.
However, if the judgment was recovered after the commencement
of the work, the mechanic's lien would have priority. s
11 Haskin Wood v. Cleveland, supra.
2 2 Va. Code §43-20 (1950).
23 Atlas Portland Cement Company v. Main Line Realty Corp., 112 Va. 7,
70 S.E. 536 (1911).
14 Ibid.
i5 Carter v. Keeton, 112 Va. 307, 71 S.E. 554 (1911).
16 Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 12 S.E. 2d 801 (1941)
17 Feuchtenberger v. Williamson, 137 Va. 578, 120 S.E. 257 (1923).
'" 1 Minor, Real Property, § 694 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
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'd) Perfecting Mechanic's Liens
Section 43-4 of the Code prescribes the method for perfecting
the lien by a general contractor. The memorandum required must
include (1) the name of the owner of the property, (2) the claim-
ant, (3) the amount and consideration of the claim, (4) the time
or times the claim is or will be due and payable, (5) verified by the
oath of the claimant, (6) including a statement declaring his inten-
tion to claim the benefit of the lien and (7) a brief description of
the property.
In general the memorandum must be filed at any time after
the work is done and the material furnished and before the ex-
piration of sixty days after the building is completed or the work
otherwise terminated. The date from which the sixty days will
begin to run may be at a time other than when the building is com-
pleted, for instance, when the contractor's job is completed or
when the owner orders the work to be stopped.
The time of the actual completion of the structure is the time
intended by the statute; however, if the contract provides that the
building will be considered completed before the "finishing touches"
are completed, then the claim will begin to run before the com-
pletion of the "finishing touches."1
It is not necessary for notice to be given by the general con-
tractor to the owner of the filing of the lien. The filing in the clerk's
office is considered sufficient notice.20
e) Perfecting Liens by Subcontractors
If a subcontractor wishes to secure the benefit of a lien upon
the building, the statute provides methods by which he can do so:
(1) He may acquire an independent lien of his own by much the
same procedure as is required of the general contractor;2 ' or (2)
he may secure the benefit of the lien already obtained by the gen-
eral contractor. 22
In order to secure an independent lien, the subcontractor must
do one thing more than is necessary for a general contractor.
19 Trustees v. Davis, 85 Va. 193, 72 S.E. 245 (1888).
20 Coleman v. Pearman, 159 Va. 72, 165 S.E. 371 (1932).
21 Va. Code §43-7 (1950).
22 Va. Code §43-18 (1950).
Written notice must be given to the owner of the filing of the lien.
It has been held that written notice is required even if the owner
had knowledge of the filing unless it appeared that written notice
had been waived.2 3
This section of the statute was designed for the protection of
the subcontractor so a fortiori if the general contractor is not in-
debted to the subcontractor, the subcontractor is not entitled to a
lien.2
4
The owner's liability to a subcontractor is limited to the
amount owed by the owner to the general contractor at the time
the notice is given. But the owner cannot defeat the claim of a sub-
contractor by giving his negotiable notes to the general contractor
in payment of labor and materials.
2 5
If the subcontractor has furnished labor or materials for one
who is only a subcontractor, the statute provides that the person
claiming the lien shall also give notice to the general contractor
(as well as the owner), the notice being similar to that given to the
owner, but the amount to be claimed in such case shall not exceed
the amount for which the debtor subcontractor may himself claim
a lien.2
The lien secured by the general contractor inures to the benefit
of the subcontractor, if the subcontractor gives written notice to the
owner before the lien is discharged.
There is still a third protection afforded to subcontractors by
the statute; however, this is against the owner or the general con-
tractor in their individual capacities. 7
f) Waiver or Destruction of Mechanic's Liens
Minor states:
The mechanic's lien, it is believed follows the general
rule applicable to other liens, and is not to be regarded
as lost or waived by the taking of other and additional
23 Coleman v. Pearman, supra.
24 Wilson Co. v. McManus, 162 Va. 30, 173 S.E. 361 (1934).
25 Kinnier Co. v. Cofer, 13 Va. Law Reg. (N.S.) 238 (1927).
26 Va. Code §43-9 (1950).
2 7 Va. Code §43-11 (1950).
security by lien or otherwise, unless the intention to waive
or abandon is manifest. 28
If the contractor abandons the contract, or if the building is




For the purpose of the title examiner, tax liens on real estate
arise from: county and muncipal taxes, special assessments for local
improvements, state gift taxes, state inheritance taxes and federal
taxes.
The title examiner must determine for each category what taxes,
assessments and liens have been levied and assessed against the
property and are liens on it at the time of the search. He must note
all unpaid installments of any assessment previously levied and in
force, whether due or not. Finally, he must obtain all pertinent in-
formation, if any, regarding tax sales of the property which might
constitute a cloud on the title.
The sources from which the necessary information can be ob-
tained are as follows:
County and Municipal Taxes
a.) Delinquent Tax List-for outstanding taxes more than
two years old.
b.) Assessment Roll in Treasurer's Office-for. taxes assessed
within the past two years.
Local Improvement Assessments
a.) Special Assessment Roll in Treasurer's Office.
State Gift Taxes
a.) A bona fide purchaser for value of the property takes
free from these taxes. Therefore, a search does not
28 1 Minor, Real Property, §698 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
29 Ibid.
appear to be necessary. The only available source of in-
formation seems to be the State Department of Taxation.
State Inheritance Taxes
a.) The Tax Certificate-received by the decedent's estate
or by the person who paid the taxes.
b.) Probate Records-for discharge in a probate proceeding.
c.) State Department of Taxation
Tax Sale
a.) List of Delinquent Land Sales in Treasurer's Office-
if search is made within sixty days of the tax sale.
b.) Delinquent Land Book (in office of Clerk of Court
where deeds are recorded)-if search is made after sixty
days from time of tax sale.
Federal Taxes
a.) Grantor-Grantee Index for the Deed Books
In addition, it is necessary to check the Judgment Lien
Book to ascertain whether any of the governmental bodies have
reduced an outstanding tax obligation to a judgment.
County and Municipal Liens
In Virginia, taxable real estate has been segregated and made
subject to local taxation only.' The owner of real estate on January
first of each year is assessed for the taxes for the year beginning on
that day.2 A lien then arises against the real estate for the payment
of taxes and levies,' which also become personal charges against the
owner.
4
"Due process of law" demands that the property to be taxed
be properly and accurately listed in the landbooks. In conjunction
I Virginia Constitution, §171; Va. Code §58-9 (1950).
2 Va. Code §§58-4, 58-796 (1950).
3 Va. Code §§58-762, 58-1023, 58-1024 (1950).
4 Va. Code §§58-850, 58-1001, 58-1014 (1950). And see Kincholoe v.
Gibson, 115 Va. 119, 78 S.E. 603 (1913); Richmond v. Monument
Ave. Develop. Corp., 184 Va. 152, 34 S.E. 2d 223 (1945).
with this, the word "owner" as used in the statute' relating to the
assessment of real estate has been determined to be any person who
has the usufruct, control or occupation of the land, whether his
interest in it is an absolute fee, or an estate less than a fee.0 Also,
the listing is valid if the name in the landbook is the true name of
the freehold owner, or so nearly like it as to make it impossible to
mistake for whom the name is intended.7
Erroneous Assessment
If a mistake is made in assessing taxes, within two years from
December 31st of the year in which the court may increase, reduce
or otherwise correct it; and the owner may apply to the court for
relief within two years after the year in which the assessment was
made.8
Liability for Taxes
Generally, the liability for taxes of parties to transactions af-
fecting the interest in assessed land is as follows:
Sale of Land-the payment of taxes by either vendor or
vendee constitutes full satisfaction of the taxes legally chargeable
upon the land. 9 Also, a vendee of land has a right to apply his
purchase money towards the payment of taxes on the land, and the
fact that the taxes for the current year in which the property is
sold have not been paid is not a valid objection to the title.'0
Death of Owner-when the owner dies intestate, the land
may be charged to his heirs or to his estate until transferred from
it." The failure to charge land to his estate upon the landbooks
will not invalidate an assessment of taxes in his name instead of
that of his estate, and a sale of the land for delinquent taxes will
5 Va. Code §58-796 (1950).
6 Stark v. Norfolk, 183 Va. 282, 32 S.E. 2d 59 (1944).
72 Minor, Real Property, §1263 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928) ; Stevenson v.
Henkle, 100 Va. 591, 42 S.E. 672 (1902).
8 Va. Code §58-1145 (1950).
9 Lohrs v. Miller, 12 Gratt. (53 Va.) 452 (1855); Sturns v. Fleming, 26
W. Va. 54 (1885)
'o Clark v. Hutzler, 96 Va. 73, 30 S.E. 469 (1898).
21 Va. Code §58-771 (1950).
pass title.' 2 When he has devised land, it may be charged to the
devisees; but, if under the will the land is to be sold, it is charged to
the decedent's estate until transferred.' 3 In any event, a lien for
taxes on the lands of a decedent can never be enforced so long as
there is personal property. The latter must first be exhausted.'
4
Life Estate and Remainder-the burden of paying taxes is on
the life tenant rather than upon the remainderman.' 5 If the life
tenant refuses to pay the taxes, the remainderman may have the
rents appropriated to that purpose.' But the rule is modified where
the life tenant is allowed to encroach on the principal and the prin-
cipal itself is liable for such taxes. 7 In any event, in the absence of
statute there can be no apportionment of the taxes between the life
tenant and the remainderman' 8
Mortgage-a mortgagee not in possession and not receiving
the rents and profits of the land may pay the taxes or not as he
chooses, but is not bound to do so.' 9
Deed of Trust-when the owner simply gives a deed of trust
to secure the payment of money, the land remains on the landbooks
in the name of the owner and is taxed in his name.2 0 By statute,21
the purchaser at a sale under a deed of trust must see that the pro-
ceeds are applied to the payment of all taxes and levies assessed
on the real estate, the provisions of Section 55-5922 to the contrary
notwithstanding.
12 Coles v. Jamerson, 112 Va. 311, 71 S.E. 618 (1911).
"1 Va. Code §58-771 (1950).
14 Pugh v. Russell, 27 Gratt (68 Va.) 789 (1876).
'5 Glenn v. West, 106 Va. 356, 56 S.E. 143 (1907); Richmond v. McKenny
194 Va. 427, 73 S.E. 2d 414 (1952).
16 Downey v. Strouse, 101 Va. 226, 43 S.E. 348 (1903).
17 Haythe v. Patteson, 2 Va. Law Reg. 563 (1896).
is Comm. v. Wilson, 141 Va. 116, 126 S.E. 220 (1925).
19Harvie v. Banks, 1 Rand. (22 Va.) 408 (1823).
20 Va. Code §58-797 (1950). And see Stevenson v. Henkle, 100 Va. 591,
42 S.E. 672 (1902).
2
' Va. Code §58-762 (1950).
22 Va. Code §58-762 (1950). And see Va. Code §55-59 (13) (1950): The
.trustee shall receive and receipt for the proceeds of sale, no purchaser
being required to see to the application of the proceeds, and apply the
same, first, . . ., secondly, to discharge all taxes, levies, and assessments,
with costs and interest ....
Lease-as a general rule the landlord under an ordinary lease
is responsible for the taxes on the property leased, but this rule
has no application to the case of a perpetual leaseholder who is in
effect the virtual owner of the property and cntitled to its use for-
ever.
23
Priority of the Lien
The tax lien is a first claim on the property, with precedence
over any other lien or encumbrance. It continues in force until
actual payment is made to the proper officer of the taxing author-
ity.2 '
Duration and Release of the Lien
It has been provided by statute that: liens delinquent for
twenty years or more are deemed to have expired;2 - liens for taxes
due prior to 1937 upon realty acquired for lodge purposes by any
benevolent or charitable association are relased for any year(s)
in which no rents and profits or income whatever were received
from the realty;2 6 real estate purchased by the Commonwealth or
a subdivision thereof at a delinquent land sale, or which is delin-
quent for taxes and levies and has been sold in a suit in which the
Commonwealth or the subdivision thereof is a party, or becomes a
party by proving a debt in the suit, is not liable for any taxes or
liens which could have been proven in the suit or on account of
which it was sold.2
7
Penalty and Interest For Failure To Pay Taxes
A penalty of 5% of the amount due is added to the taxes and
levies if not paid on or before August 15 of each year for real
23 Norfolk v. Perry Co., 108 Va. 28, 61 S.E. 867 (1908).
24 Va. Code §58-762 (1950).
25Va. Code §58-767 (1950). According to Cox A Manual For Title
Examiners in Virginia (2d Ed.) §191: "The Claim that (this)
statute is in violation of sections 174 and 183 of the Virginia Con-
stitution has never been decided by our Court of Appeals. It is contended
that they do not release any claims of the State for taxes, or set up a
bar to the collection of taxes, but simply release the tax lien on the
land (120 Va. 835, 843 (1917); 137 Va. 542, 551 (1923); 4 Va. Law
Reg. (N.S.) 161, 169)." Cf. Jennings v. Norfolk, 198 Va. 277, 93 S.E.
2d 302 (1956).
26 Va. Code §15-669 (1950).
27 Va. Code §15-676 (1950).
property situated in a county with a population density of two
thousand inhabitants per square mile. For all other real property
assessed the penalty attaches as of December 5th of the same year.2 8
Interest accrues against the delinquent land at the rate of 6%
per year from February 15th of the year next following the assess-
ment year for taxes required to be paid by August 15th of the
assessment year and from June 30th of the year next following the
assessment year for taxes required to be paid by December 5th of
the assessment year. But the provision does not apply to local levies




Not later than August 1 of each year the treasurer of each
county or city must prepare a list of lands delinquent as of June
30th of the year following the assessment year. Copies of the list
must be submitted to the governing body of the county or city and
to the clerk of courts in whose office deeds are admitted to record-
for recording in "The Delinquent Land Book". 30
Until town taxes returned delinquent are entered in the record,
the real estate is not liable for town taxes as against purchases for




Taxes and levies are still collected for one year following June
30th of the year in which they are recorded in "The Delinquent
Land Book". 3 2 At the end of that period, the lists, with changes
recorded, are resubmitted to the governing body of the county or
city. At that time the decision is made either to continue collections
or to sell the lands included on the list.3 3
For lands to be sold, the sale occurs on the second Monday in
2 8 Va. Code §58-963 (1950).
29Va. Code §58-964 (1950).
30 Va. Code §§58-978, 58-979, 58-983 (1950).
31 Va. Code §58-1110 (1950).
32 Va. Code §58-989 (1950).
33 Va. Code §58-990 (1950).
the following December. 4 The sale must first be preceded by
proper advertisement and notice, without which it is void.35
It is expressly provided by statute that the sale of country lands
shall be of each tract separately, or of such quantity or part of it
as shall be sufficient to satisfy the taxes and levies on it, with
interest and charges; and that the sale of city and town lots shall
be of each lot separately, or of such undivided interest therein as
shall suffice for the same purpose.3 6
While this statute requires each tract or lot to be sold sep-
arately, thus prohibiting the sale of several lots en masse, sale, it
would seem, must follow the assessment list, and if several adjacent
tracts are used and occupied together, and are so assessed, they
may be considered as one tract for purposes of sale.3 7
The illegality of any part of the taxes for which the land is
sold taints the whole transaction and renders the sale void.38 Also,
the safer and better rule is that the sale is void for any excess (tax)
.whatever.3 9
The county or city treasurer makes the tax sale.40 But the
power to sell ceases with his official term, and a sale made by him
thereafter is void.41
The Virginia statutes4 2 are generally construed to provide that
the sale is to be made to the highest bidder, i.e., the bidder who
will pay the taxes, costs and charges for the least quantity of land,
leaving the balance of the delinquent tract to the owner."3
The Private Purchaser at the Tax Sale
In general, any person who may purchase land in a private
transaction may purchase at a tax sale. But there are certain well
34 Va. Code §58-1029 (1950).
35 Va. Code §58-1030 (1950); Attkisson v. Moore, 159 Va. 643, 167 S.E.
367 (1933).
36 Va. Code §58-1033 (1950).
37 See footnote 34.
38 2 Minor, Real Property, §1270 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
39 Ibid.
4 0 Va. Code §58-1029 (1950).
41 McCullough v. Hunter, 90 Va. 699, 19 S.E. 776 (1894).
4 2 Va. Code §§1029-1032 (1950).
43 Kinney v. Beverly, 2 Hen. & M. (12 Va.) 318, 319 (1808).
defined cases in which a tax sale will be rendered invalid by reason
of the character of the purchaser, or at least the purchaser will be
considered in equity as holding the legal title only as a constructive
trustee.44
One whose duty it is to pay the taxes on a tract of land not
belonging entirely to him, cannot, by neglecting to pay them and
thus causing the land to be sold to the detriment of others inter-
ested, add to or strengthen his own title by purchasing the land at
a tax sale. Such a purchase operates merely as a payment of the
taxes, leaving the title in precisely the same situation as if the taxes
had been paid when due. These principles apply in the case of a
tenant in common, a tenant for life, a tenant for years under a
covenant to pay taxes, a mortgagee or a mortgagor in possession.4 5
Whether, in Virginia, one who holds by a defective title may
perfect it by purchasing the land at a tax sale, provided he stands
in no relation of trust to the owner, and is implicated in no fraud
against him is to be doubted. The doubt is created by the statutory
provision that the purchaser is to take at the tax sale the title which
is vested in the party who is assessed with the taxes for which the
sale is made, that is, the party legally bound to pay the tax (ac-
cording to the supposition made above, the tax purchaser him-
self.) 46
An agent, attorney, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary
having the control and management of real estate, or a joint tenant
or tenant in common is disqualified from purchasing the same
at a tax sale on his own account, without having previously re-
nounced the agency or trust, even though the principal or bene-
ficiary fails to supply him with funds to meet the taxes. Also, neither
a husband nor a wife is permitted to be a purchaser of the property
of the other at a tax sale, and an attempted purchase by one of
them is treated merely as a payment of the taxes due by the other.47
It is expressly provided by statute that the treasurer conducting
the sale shall not, directly or indirectly, purchase any real estate




sold. If he does, he forfeits fifty dollars for every such purchase and
the sale is void.4 8
Since the clerk of court is to execute the deed to the tax pur-
chaser, and he has no connection with the sale itself,4 9 he is per-
mitted to purchase at the sale provided that the deed is executed
by a special commissioner appointed by the court for that pur
pose.5 0
Upon completion of the sale the purchaser is given a receipt
setting forth the terms of the purchase. 51
Sale Recorded-within sixty days after the completion of the
sale the treasurer must report it to the proper court where, after
confirmation, the sale is recorded in "The Delinquent Land Book".52
Relief Against Sale-Any person aggrieved by reason of the
confirmation of such sale may apply for relief to the proper circuit
or corporation court at any time prior to the execution of a tax
deed to the purchaser. Upon proper showing the court may annul
the sale, exonerate the real estate and restore the purchase money
to the purchaser. 53
Redemption Subsequent To Sale-After the tax sale, and
prior to the expiration of the redemption period and the execution
of the tax deed, the purchaser has an equitable interest, 4 defeasible
if the owner redeems. And the Virginia statute provides that he
may, after confirmation of the sale by the court, enter and hold
possession of the land sold, if neither the owner nor anyone claim-
ing under him be in the actual possession of it; but if someone is
in possession, the purchaser may require him to redeem the land
4 8 Va. Code §58-1034 (1950).
49 Va. Code §§58-1052, 58-1057 (1950).
50 Va. Code §58-1059 (1950).
51 Va. Code §58-1035 (1950).
5 2 Va. Code §§58-1036, 58-1038 (1950).
53 Va. Code §58-1042 (1950).
5 2 Minor, Real Property, §1286 (2d. Ed. Rbible, 1928) See also footnote
3 where it is stated: "Though the above rule seems to accord with
the better reasoning, yet there is much conflict as to what title, if any,
passes to the purchaser upon the.sale, but before the deed is delivered
and recorded. It has been said, by way of dictum, that no title passes
under the Virginia statutes until the deed has been recorded. Ashbrook
v. Bailey, 116 Va. 10, 81 S.E. 64 (1914)2'
187
within sixty days, which if he fails to do, the purchaser may enter
and take possession."
The owner of the land, his heirs or assigns, or any person
having the right to charge the land with a debt may redeem it
within three years from the date of sale, 56 or within three years
after the removal of disabilities of infancy, insanity, or imprison-
ment with the right to such redemption not to exceed twenty-
years.
57
The redeeming party must pay to the purchaser, his heirs or
assigns the whole amount paid by the purchaser and such addi-
tional taxes, levies, costs and charges as may have been paid by him
since the sale, with interest at the rate of 6% per year on the
amount so paid.5 8 But, if the purchaser, his heirs or assigns refuse
to receive it or do not reside or cannot be found in the county or
city, the money may be paid to the clerk of the court. 59 In either




Tax Title-upon expiration of the three year period of re-
demption, the purchaser of unredeemed real estate, his heirs or
assigns must give to all parties concerned four months notice of his
intention to apply to the clerk of court for a deed to the real
estate.6" The person entitled to redeem may do so at any time prior
to the expiration of the four months.6 2 If the land is not redeemed
within the four month period, the purchaser is entitled to a tax
deed and may compel the execution of it by motion or petition to
the court6s or by mandamus.6 4 He must, however, obtain the tax
55 Va. Code §58-1039 (1950). This section has been further construed
to the effect that the owner of the land at the time of the tax sale
continues to be the owner until divested of title. Richmond v. Monu-
ment Ave. Develop. Corp., 184 Va. 152, 34 S.E. 2d 223 (1952).
5 6 Va. Code §58-1043 (1950).
57 Va. Code §58-1047 (1950).
58 Va. Code §58-1043 (1950).
50 Va. Code §58-1045 (1950).
60 Va. Code §§58-1043, 58-1045 (1950).
61 Va. Code §§58-1052, 58-1053 (1950).
62 Va. Code §58-1054 (1950).
63Va. Code §§58-1061 and 1062 (1950).
64McCullough v. Hunter, 90 Va. 699, 19 S.E. 776 (1894); Brooke v.
Turner, 95 Va. 696, 30. S.E. 55 (1898); 4 Va. Law Reg. 85 (1898).
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deed within one year after the expiration of the three year re-
demption period, for, after that period of time has elapsed, the
former owner (or his heirs or assigns) may thereafter redeem the
land at any time before the deed or order is made.'s
When the purchaser, his heirs or assigns have obtained a deed,
and it has been duly admitted to record, such estate is acquired as
was vested in the person assessed with the taxes at the commence-
ment of the year for which the taxes were assessed, or in any person
claiming under such party.6" Thus, if the party assessed has no title,
then the purchaser at the tax sale acquires none. 67 In addition the
purchaser does not take the estate subject to the liens, conditions or
incumbrances vesting on it at the time the taxes were assessed. 8
But, where adverse title has ripened before the tax sale is held or
will ripen so soon after the tax sale that suit cannot be instituted
before the adverse title ripens, the tax lien is, or may be, valueless.6 9
The tax deed itself is sufficient to pass the title of the former
owner, until it is successfully impeached by any contesting party.7 0
The deed can be impeached only by proof (1) that the taxes for
which the land was sold were not properly chargeable to it; (2)
that the taxes were paid; (3) that the notice of sale was not duly
given; or (4) that the payment or redemption was prevented by
fraud or concealment on the part of the purchaser; provided that
no suit can be brought to set aside, cancel or annul a tax deed,
made according to the statute, except for fraud, unless it be brought
within two years after the deed is duly admitted to record. 71
As to all steps or circumstances relating to the sale, other than
those referable to one or the other of these four heads, the tax deed
(supposing it to have been validly executed) is made conclusive
65 Va. Code §58-1063 (1950).
66 Va. Code §58-1064 (1950). And see Ashbrook v. Bailey, 116 Va. 10, 81
S.E. 64 (1914).
67 Ashbrook v. Bailey, 116 Va. 10, 81 S.E. 64 (1914), citing Yancey v.
Hopkins, 1 Munf. (15 Va.) 419 (1810).
68 2 Minor, Real Property, §1290 (2d. Ed. Ribble, 1928). See also
Simmons v. Lyles, 32 Gratt (73 Va.) 752 (1880); Thomas v. Jones
94 Va. 756, 27 S.E. 813 (1897); Stevenson v. Henkle, 100 Va. 591,
42 S.E. 762 (1902).
69 McClanahan v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 122 Va. 705, 96 S.E. 453 (1918).
70 Bond v. Pettit, 89 Va. 474, 16 S.E. 666 (1892). See Huchings v. Gilmer
1 Va. Dec. 495.
71 Va. Code §58-1064 (1950).
evidence of the validity of the purchaser's title; and it is made
prima facie evidence even of these, ripening into conclusive evi-
dence after two years as to all, save in cases of fraud.72
Effect of Sale on Title of Remainderman-a tax sale on ac-
count of the default of the life tenant will not affect or divest the
title of a tenant in reversion or remainder.7
3
The State As Purchaser at the Tax Sale
If there are no sufficient bids, authority is given to the treasurer
making the sale to purchase the land in the name of the Common-
weatlh for the benefit of the county, city or town, respectively.74
Such a purchase by the Commonwealth does not interfere with
an action or suit by any person claiming to be entitled to the real
estate, to recover possession of it, to try the title, to recover damages
for any injury done to it, or to prevent injury to it. However, no
execution or other process is issued upon a judgment or decree in
favor of the plaintiff until he has paid the delinquent and other
taxes and charges due the state.
7 5
Sale Recorded-a list of all lands purchased by the Common-
wealth must be reported to the proper court, confirmed, and re-
corded in "The Delinquent Land Book".
78
At the time the list is returned to the court for confirmation,
the title vests in the state as of the time the sale was made to it.7
Redemption Subsequent To Purchase-within three years of
the purchase of the land by the Commonwealth redemption may
be made by the previous owner, his heirs or assigns, or any person
having the right to charge the land with a debt.78 The redemption
money must be paid to the clerk who is required to endorse pay-
ment on "The Delinquent Land Book".79 Also, so long as the state
72 Crawford v. Floyd, 112 Va. 699, 72 S.E. 711 (1911).
73 Va. Code §58-1065 (1950).
74 Va. Code §58-1067 (1950).
75Va. Code §58-1069 (1950).
76Va. Code §§58-1036, 58-1038 (1950).
7 7Richmond v. Monument Ave. Develop. Corp., 184 Va. 152, 34 S.E. 2d
223 (1952).
78 Va. Code §58-1083 (1950).
79 Va. Code §58-1073 (1950).
retains the land, the owner of part or all the delinquent land may,
with the court's authorization, redeem a part only of the delinquent
land and hold it free from any lien for taxes due on the residue
of the tract.80
Tax Title-if the land is unredeemed at the end of three
years, any person may, upon proper application, purchase it from
the Commonwealth. 8 '
Copies of the application must be served on the parties in the
same manner as a process in a suit, or, if the parties are nonresidents
or cannot be found after diligent search, service may be made by
publication.8 2
If no person who has a right to redeem the land appears within
four months and redeems it by paying the required amount to the
clerk, then the applicant, within five days from the expiration of
the four months, may complete the purchase. If the applicant does
not exercise his right within the five days, he forfeits not only the
deposit made with the clerk, but also his right to the land, which
is again available to anyone desiring to purchase it. 83
If the deed is not made out to the purchaser within one year
from the application (unless hindered by judicial proceedings),
the right of redemption revives to the owner or others entitled to
redeem, and continues until the deed is made. The tax deed must
be made within two years from the date of the application, and, if
the deed be not made within this time (unless hindered by judicial
proceedings), the purchaser forfeits both the land and his purchase
money.8 4
In addition to the above remedies, the land, if unredeemed for
three years, may be sold by a bill in equity filed in the name of the
Commonwealth or county, city or town in which it lies. The char-
acter of the title acquired by the purchaser at the judicial sale is
governed by the principles and rules applicable to judicial sales
80 Va. Code §58-1077 (1950).
81 Va. Code §§58-1083, 58-1084 (1950).
82 Va. Code §§58-1086 through 58-1089 (1950).
83 Va. Code §58-1090 (1950).
84 Va. Code §58-1093 (1950); 2 Minor, Real Property, §1279 (2d Ed.
Ribble, 1928).
generally and not by those applicable to tax titles acquired through
tax deeds.8 5
Other principles applicable to tax sales made by the Common-
wealth are included generally, in the preceding section, "The
Private Purchaser at the Tax Sale".
Local Improvements
Special Assessments-The Constitution of Virginia"8 provides
that assessments may be levied for making and improving walkways
upon existing streets, paving and improving existing alleys and for
the construction or the use of sewers. The taxes or assessments for
such local improvements can be imposed on abutting land owners
only in cities, towns and counties with a population greater than
five hundred inhabitants per square mile.8 7
The amount finally assessed against or apportioned to each
landowner, or fixed by agreement with him is a lien on his abutting
land from the time when the work of improvement is completed.
But, it will not be enforced against a purchaser for value and with-
out notice unless an abstract of the resolution is recorded in the
judgment docket of the clerk's office and indexed in the name of
the city, town or county and of the owner of the property.88
Assessments for local improvements are superior in dignity
to all other liens on the land on which they are assessed.8 9
Drainage Taxes-As in the case of state and county taxes,
drainage assessments have the force and effect of a judgment. They
constitute a lien upon the lands assessed which is second only to
state, county and district taxes and levies.9 ° Assessments are not
made against "abutting" owners as a class but rather against all
landowners whose lands within the drainage district are benefited.9 1
Assessments are due and payable on the first Monday in Sep-
tember of each year. They become delinquent if not paid in full by
85 Va. Code §58-1108 (1950).
86 §170.
87Va. Code §15-669 (1950).
88 Va. Code §15-676 (1950).
89 Richmond v. Williams, 102 Va. 733, 47 S.E. 844 (1904).
90 Va. Code §21-374 (1950).
91 Strawberry Hill Land Corp. v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S.E. 362 (1918).
December 31st of the same year. Entry as delinquent on his copy of
the assessment rolls by the treasurer of the county in which the
lands are located constitutes notice of the lien. 2
When lands liable for assessments are sold, in whole or in part,
the new owner is liable for the drainage assessment upon the portion
of the land purchased.93
Delinquent assessments bear interest at the legal rate plus a
penalty of 5% of the assessment.9 ' If an assessment remains delin-
quent for more than a year, the land will be sold to enforce pay-
ment.95 If the purchase price has been paid and no objection is
made within thirty days after the sale, the land sold is conveyed to
the purchaser by special warranty deed. All persons having actual
or constructive notice of the sale are precluded from thereafter ob-
jecting to it.96 Prior to the time such deeds are granted, notice, by
publication, must be given to any person who immediately prior to
the sale was a record owner of the land, informing them that they
may, within four months after the first publication of notice, redeem
the land.9 7
Land sold can be redeemed by any person having an estate in
or lien on it.93 Redemptiori is made in accordance with the existing
general tax law in force when the land is sold.99 If the record owner
does redeem the land, the purchaser at the sale is repaid from the
amount paid in redemption. The former owner will then hold the
land discharged from the lien. °0
The governing body of a county may release drainage tax liens
provided that the drainage bonds of the district are owned and held
solely for the county.' 0"
92 Va. Code §21-375 (1950).
93 Va. Code §21-389 (1950).
94 Va. Code §21-376 (1950).
95 Va. Code §§21-377, 21-278 (1950).
96 Va. Code §21-387 (1950).
9 7 Va. Code §21-391 (1950).
9 8 Va. Code §21-383 (1950).
99 Va. Code §21-380 (1950).
100 Va. Code §21-392 (1950).
10 Va. Code §21-426 (1950).
State Gift Taxes
State gift taxes become a lien upon all gifts that constitute the
basis'1 2 for the taxes for a period of ten years from the time they
are made.' 0 3 If the tax is not paid within thirty days after it
becomes due,"" collection may be enforced from the donor or
donee.1°5 The donee is liable only for so much of the tax as may
be due on account of his respective gift.' 0 6 Any part of the gift
property sold by the donee to a bona fide purchaser for an adequate
and full consideration is divested of the lien, which, to the extent
of the value of gift sold, attaches to all the property of the donee,
including after-acquired property, except any part sold to a bona
fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration.' 07
The amount of the tax must be assessed within three years
after the return is filed. However, the tax may be assessed at any
time in the case of a false or fraudulent return with an intent to
evade the tax or of a failure to file a return.' 08
State Inheritance Taxes
Estates of Resident Decedents-Property of which a decedent
dies seized or possessed and all property acquired in substitution
thereof is charged with a lien for all state inheritance taxes due
thereon.' 0 9 The taxes are payable one year after the death of the
decedent but may be extended to fifteen months by the Department
of Taxation. An exception is made where the right of possession or
actual enjoyment follows a life estate or a term of years; then the
taxes are payable one year after the right of possession accrues. 1 0
The lien may be discharged by payment of the taxes due and
to become due, or by an order or decree of the court discharging the
102 See Va. Code §§21-218 to 21-222 (1950).
'
0 3 Va. Code §58-227 (1950).
104 On or "beforc" the fifteenth day of April following the close of the
calendar year-Va. Code §58-223 (1950).
'
0 5 Va. Code §58-227 (1950).
106 Va. Code §58-229 (1950).
107 Va. Code §58-227 (1950).
los Va. Code §58-230 (1950).
109 Va. Code §58-180 (1950).
"10 Va. Code §58-176 (1950).
lien and securing the payment of the taxes by bond or deposit.' 1
If taxes are not paid within thirty days after the due date, the
land may be sold or, in the alternative, rented or leased for an
amount sufficient to pay the taxes due and expenses and fees in-
curred.1 12
When real estate has been sold by the heirs or devisees of the
decedent, or their successors in title, to a purchaser for value, the
lien expires by limitation if:"'
a) at the end of the ten years after the death of the decedent,
no assessment has been made in the meantime,
b) more than ten years have passed since the death of the
decedent and no assessment has been made up to date of
sale,
c) twenty years have passed since the death of the decedent
and the land was originally received from the decedent
in fee simple with no remainder or executory interest.
Estates of Non-Resident Decedents-Since June 17, 1930, state
inheritance taxes on the estates within this Commonwealth of non-
resident decedents are due and payable at the time of death of
the decedent.
If not paid within one year, interest attaches at the rate of
12% per year. The taxes interest remain a lien on the property
transferred until paid." 4 Any real estate which passes in contem-
plation of death or is intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after the death of the grantor or donor is also subject
to the inheritance tax." 5
Federal Taxes
Under the United States Internal Revenue Code all taxes and
assessments which are due the United States, together with any
1" Va. Code §58-180 (1950).
212 Va. Code §58-181 (1950).
13 Va. Code §58-180 (1950).
"14 Va. Code §58-199 (1950).
2"5 Va. Code §58-200 (1950).
interest, penalties and costs are a lien upon all property and rights
to property belonging to the debtor.""' The tax becomes a lien
at the time the assessment is made and continues until it is paid or
becomes unenforceable by reason of the lapse of time."'
The act provides that the tax lien will not be valid, except for
securities,"18 as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judg-
ment creditor until notice of it has been filed by the Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate. The notice must be filed in accordance
with the law of the state in which the property subject to the lien
is situated,"19 whenever the state by law provides for the filing of
such notice.' 20 Where no provision has been made by the state
for filing the notice, it must be filed in the office of the United
States District Court Clerk for the judicial district in which the
property subject to the lien is located. However, if the notice filed
with the state is in a form that would be valid if filed with the
Clerk of the United States District Court, the notice is valid not-




To enforce the tax, the Internal Revenue Act provides for the
sale of the debtor's real estate.' 2 2 The sale is made after notice and
publication to the highest bidder over a minimum price set by the
Secretary or his delegate. If no one bids the amount of the minimum
price, the United States purchases the property itself, at the mini-
mum price.12 3
If the property is not redeemed within the time limited by the
act, the Secretary or his delegate must execute a deed of the real
estate to the purchaser upon his surrender of the certificate of
sale.12 4 The deed operates as prima facie evidence of the facts
stated in it, and if the proceedings of sale are pursued substantially
in accordance with the law, the deed operates as a conveyance of
1- 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6321.
.17 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6322.
I's 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6323 (c).
119 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6323 (a).
120 See Va. Code §55-139 (1950).
12226 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6323(a) (1) (2) (3).
122 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §§6331-6336.
12326 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6335(e) (1).
124 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6338.
all the right, title and interest which the delinquent taxpayer has
in the property at the time the lien attaches to it.
1 25
At any time before the sale, the owner of the property may
pay the tax with interest and costs and from that time all further
proceedings against the property will cease.'2 6 Within one year
after the sale, the owner, his heirs, executors, or administrators, or
any person interested in the property or possessing a lien upon it,
or any person in their behalf, may redeem the land sold, upon the
payment of the purchase price with interest at the rate of 205 per
year, to the purchaser, or if he cannot be found, then to the Sec-
retary or his delegate.'2 7
Any person having a lien upon or any interest in the property
recorded prior to the tax lien notice, or any person purchasing the
property at a sale to satisfy such prior lien or interest may make a
written request to the Secretary or his delegate to authorize the
filing of a civil action to clear title to the property. 2 8 If the Secre-
tary or his delegate fails to do so within six months, then after
notice to the collector, such person may file a petition with the
United States District Court for the district where the land is
located, for leave to file a bill to settle all claims to the realty. After
a hearing on the petition, the court may enter an order granting
leave to file the action.' 29 All persons having liens upon or claiming
any interest in the property must be made parties to the suit.' 30 The
court will determine the merit of all claims to and liens upon the
property.' 13
The act provides under what circumstances the tax lien may
be discharged. A certicate of release of the tax lien may be issued in
cases where the tax and interest have been paid or have become
unenforceable, 3 2 or if a bond conditioned for the payment of the
tax and interest is given and accepted."' The Secretary or his dele-
125 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6339(b).
126 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6337(a).
27 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6337(b).
128 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §7424 (a) (1).
129 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §7424(a) (2) (3).
130 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §7403(b).
'3' 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §7403(c).
132 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6325(a) (1).
133 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6325(a) (2).
gate may give a certificate of partial discharge of any part of the
property subject to the lien, if the value of the balance of such
property is worth at least twice the amount of the tax lien and the
amount of all prior liens on the property.' 34 Any certificate of
release or partial discharge given by the collector is held conclusive
that the lien on the property covered by the certificate has been
extinguished.' 5
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
Liens for Estate Tax-The Internal Revenue Act provides that
the estate tax imposed by Chapter 11186 shall be a lien for ten years
upon the gross estate of the decedent. However, if the tax is not paid
when due, any person who receives, or has on the date of the dece-
dent's death, property included in the gross estate (under Sections
2034 to 2042 inclusive) is personally liable for the tax to the extent
of the value of such property at the time of the decedent's death,
But, if such property is transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value,
the property so transferred is divested of the lien which will then
attach to all the property of the transferor. 37
Liens for Gift Tax-The Gift Tax imposed by Chapter 12138 is
a lien for ten years from the time a gift is made. If the tax is not paid
when due, the donee is personally liable for it to the extent of the
value of the gift. Any part of the property transferred by the donee
(or by a transferee of the donee) to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee
or pledgee for value is divested of the lien which then attaches to
the property of the transferor (including after acquired property)
to the extent of the value of the gift.'3 9
Revenue Stamps
An excise tax is imposed upon each deed, instrument or writing
(unless deposited in escrow before April 1, 1932) transferring lands,
tenements or other realty. The tax is fifty-five cents when the con-
234 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6325(b) (1).
135 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6325(c).
IS8 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §§2001-2207.
187 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6324(a) (1) (2) (3).
138 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §2501-2524.
339 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §6324(b).
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sideration or value of the interest or property conveyed, exclusive
of the value of any lien or encumbrance remaining on it at the
time of sale, exceeds $100 and does not exceed $500. Each addi-
tional five-hundred dollars or part thereof is charged at the same
rate.
1 4 0
In calculating the amount of stamps which must be fixed to a
deed of conveyance, the tax is computed upon the full consideration
for the transfer less all encumbrances which rest on the property
before the sale and are not removed by the sale."' A lien or en-
cumbrance which does not affect the consideration or value of
property conveyed should not be used to reduce the amount of the
stamp to be affixed to the conveyance. 14 2
A deed otherwise complete passes title although revenue stamps
are not affixed to it.' 43
T. J. M.
8-COVENANTS
The role of the attorney in regard to restrictive covenants is
primarily one of interpretation and drafting. He must, as a title
examiner, be able to quickly grasp the meaning and scope of any
such clauses he may uncover in his search in order to advise
his client as to the effects they will have on the title to be conveyed.
As the draftsman of a deed, he must have a clear understanding of
the law of covenants in order to create a provision that will effec-
tuate the intent of his client.
Covenant or Condition.
Restrictions on the use of land may take the form of either a
condition subsequent or a covenant, and it is important that the two
be distinguished. Minor points up the distinction as follows:
The essential distinction between a covenant and a condi-
tion lies in the nature of the obligation involved and in the
140 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §4361.
141 Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. U. S., 102 Ct. C1. 633, 57 F. Supp. 691
(1944).
142 Ibid.
143 Kanner v. Startz, 203 S.W. 603 (1918).
remedy which may be had upon a breach period. A cov-
enant is a promise or agreement contained in a deed. it
is contractual in nature imposing a personal obligation
upon the covenantor. Upon a breach of the covenant, the
remedy is an action for damages, or, in a proper case, a
court of equity may grant specific performance. On the
other hand, a condition binds the estate and that alone.
The remedy for breach of condition is a forfeiture of the
estate.'
In determining whether a particular clause constitutes a con-
dition or a covenant, the courts have developed certain rules of
construction. The basic rule is that the intent of the parties as
gathered by the whole of the instrument will be controlling. It it is
doubtful whether a clause in a deed was intended as a condition
or a covenant, it will generally be held a covenant. In Lowman v.
Crawford,2 the court said: "The courts will not construe an estate
to be upon condition if the language of the deed will admit of any
other reasonable interpretation."
It should be apparent that no set rules can be stated by which
one can tell at a glance whether a particular clause is a condition.
As a draftsman of a deed, it should be obvious that the attorney,
if he intends to create a condition, must include an express state-
ment of that intent supported by a re-entry clause.
Covenants-Rules of Construction
The primary rule of construction of covenants is stated in
Schwarzschild v. Welborne as follows:
While courts of equity will enforce restrictive covenants
where the intention of the parties is clear and the restric-
tions are reasonable, they are not favored, and the burden
is on him who would enforce such covenants to establish
that the activity objected to is within their terms. They
are to be construed most strictly against the grantor and
persons seeking to enforce them, and substantial doubt or
ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free use of
property and against restrictions.3
1 Minor, Real Property, §514 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
299 Va. 688, 691, 40 S.E. 17, 18 (1907).
3 186 Va. 1052, 1058, 45 S.E. 2d 152, 155 (1947).
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Another of the basic rules of construction is that the words
used are to be taken in their ordinary and popular sense.4
There is no hard and fast rule which is applicable to every
covenant, but each case must be considered on its own merits, giv-
ing meticulous attention to the wording of the particular covenant5
and the nature of the alleged inconsistent use.
When Covenants are Unenforceable.
The question arises in the case of a deed poll, whether a par-
ticular provision is within the Statute of Frauds and therefore un-
enforceable since it is not signed by the party to be charged. A
covenant is not an interest in land, and, therefore, is not within
the statute, and a covenant in a deed poll would be enforceable
against the parties. The problem of the enforceability of a covenant
under the Statute of Fraud arises particularly where a common
grantor in opening up a tract of land attempts to inaugurate a gen-
eral scheme of improvement and imposes restrictive covenants in
each of the deeds in order to accomplish this purpose.
There is some conflict of opinion as to the treatment to be ac-
corded such restrictions. 6 The result in a given jurisdiction is going
to be dependent upon whether or not the provision is to be con-
strued as creating negative easements.7 There is no case directly in
4 See Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 99 W. Va. 388,
129 S.E. 314 (1925), where the court held that a covenant pro-
hibiting the erection of any "building" other than for dwelling or
residential purposes did not prohibit the laying of a railroad track.
The Court said, "The word building cannot be held to include every
species of erection on land, such as fences, gates or other like struc-
tures. Taken in its broadest sense, it can mean only an erection
intended for use and occupation as a habitation or for some purpose
of trade, manufacturing, ornament, or use, constituting a fabric or
edifice, such as a house, a store, a church, a shed."
P See Fox v. Sumerson, 338 Pa. 545, 12 A. 2d 1 (1940), where the building
of an apartment house was held a violation of a restrictive covenant
prohibiting any use other than "private dwelling houses." The court
said, "An apartment house is nonetheless a dwelling house though
occupied by a number of families but it is not a private dwelling
house."
6 Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913); Johnson v.
Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 P. 536
(1920).
7 For a discussion of this problem, see Reno, "Enforcement of Equitable
Servitudes in Land:' Part II, 28 Va. L. Rev. 1067 (1942).
point in Virginia, but the courts have consistently held that the
right under restrictive covenants of the type under discussion is a
negative easement."
Restraints on Alienation.
An unlimited power of alienation is generally stated as one of
the attributes of a fee simple estate. Thus, a condition or covenant
which unreasonably attempts to restrict the right of alienation of
a fee simple estate is void.' An exception of this principle exists,
however, where the restriction is reasonable:
Obviously, there can be no adequate general test of
reasonableness in this connection. The basis for decision
would seem to be whether, in the individual case, the
policy in support of free alienation on the one hand out-
weighs on the other the policy to carry out the wishes of
the grantor or testator. In connection with the determin-
ation of this question, there must be considered also the
favor or disfavor which the limitation under scrutiny has
in the law. 10
The problem arises primarily in two specific areas-first, where
it is attempted to limit the persons to whom the property may be
conveyed, and secondly, where it is attempted to limit the grantee's
use in order to protect the adjacent lands or grantor's business.
With reference to the first aspect of the problem mentioned above,
whether or not a condition is good or bad turns on the "degree of
restraint."'
s Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 2 S.E. 2d 355 (1939); Meaghor v.
Appalachian Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E. 2d 461 (1953).
9 See 1 Minor, Real Property, §553 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928).
10 Id. at §555.
"l See 1 Minor, Real Property, §555 (2d Ed. Ribble, 1928) for a dis-
cussion of this general problem where Minor points up the difference
in degree of restraint as follows: "If the condition merely excludes
certain designated persons it is good. But if the condition excludes
all except certain specified persons it is bad."
The rule was extended beyond excluding certain designated persons,
and for years restrictive covenants which excluded designated races
were held valid. In Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947), however,
the United States Supreme Court held that, although such restrictive
convenants were valid as between the parties, judicial enforcement of
them by state courts was violative of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1952), the same court held
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With reference to the second aspect of the problem the reason-
ableness of the restraint is again used as the primary test.12
Change of Conditions.
It has been seen that, while restricted covenants are not fa-
vored, they are allowed where reasonable and where they serve to
benefit other property. It follows that when a restriction reasonable
in its inception becomes unreasonable, it will no longer be enforced.
Thus, where there has been such a change in conditions as to ren-
der performance of the condition impossible, unreasonably burden-
some, or inequitable, the covenant will not be enforced.
In some instances damages will be allowed for a breach of a
covenant although the covenant itself will not be enforced.1 3
Covenants Which Run With the Land.
In order for a covenant to run with the land, that is, for the
burden or benefit of the covenant to pass to successors in title of
the covenantor and covenantee, two things are essential. First, the
covenant must be one which touches and concerns the land; and
secondly, there must be privity of estate between the parties to the
promise.
It is sometimes stated that the intention of the parties that the
covenant run is a third requisite, but this seems to be highly question-
able.""
that an award of damages by a state court in an action for breach of
such covenant was also in violation of the equal protection clause.
The result is that, today, such restrictive covenants constitute nothing
more than a gentlemen's agreement, unenforceable either in equity or
at law.
Contra; see Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar-
ringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E. 2d 114 (1955), certiorari denied, 350
U. S. 983 (1956). In this case, the grant provided for a reversion of
the estate to the grantor in the event the land was ever used by
non-whites. The court held that this was a determinable fee, the
reversion operating automatically without any judicial enforcement by
the state court, and, therefore, not in violation of any constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
12 See Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605, 85 S.E. 2d 239 (1955).
13 Amerman v. Dean, 132 N.Y. 355, 30 N.E. 741 (1892). See also Note, 12
Va. L. Rev. 502 (1926).
14 See Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed. (1939 Cum. Supp. §409).
No set rule has, or likely can, be formulated as to whether
or not a covenant touches and concerns the land. Ordinarily it is
held to do so if " . . . it is of value to the covenantee by reason of
his occupation of the land or by reason of an easement which he
has in the land, or if it is a burden on the covenantor by reason of
his occupation of the land."' 5 If the covenant does not meet the
test of touching and concerning the land, it will not run, and this
is true regardless of the intent of the parties to the covenant.
The question of privity of estate is often broken up as to priv-
ity on the burden side and privity on the benefit side. It is generally
conceded that there must be privity in order for the burden of the
covenant to run, but there is some authority for the proposition that
there is no requirement of privity in order for the benefit to run.'6
The Restatement' is the primary basis for the view that priv-
ity is not necessary on the benefit side, but it has not met with ap-
proval in all jurisdictions and "the authorities are about equally
divided upon the question."' 8
Equitable Enforcement of Covenants Against Remote Parties.
In the previous sections, the enforcement of convenants against
remote parties at law was discussed. In this section, the discussion
will cover similar enforcement in equity where there is no remedy
at law because the necessary requirements for the running of the
covenants have not been met.
The principal had its inception in the case of Tulk v. Mox-
hay,19 where the court held it was not .a question "whether the
covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted
to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered
into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased." The
doctrine, as stated, applies only to those who take with notice and
would not apply to a bona fide purchaser, but, even at that, it is not
clear how far the doctrine will go. It appears only logical that the
doctrine is going to be limited in its application according to the
15 Id. at §854.
26 Id. at §849.
"7Restatement of Property (1944) §548.
Is Tiffany, op. cit. supra, §849.
19 2 Phillips 774, 18 L.J.Ch. 83 (1848).
204
circumstances of each case in the light of the intent of the parties
to the covenant and the equities involved.
The doctrine has long had its application in Virginia. In an
1895 case, 20 the court in considering a restriction limiting the use
of the land to school purposes, said:
• . .without deciding whether this is or is not a covenant
running with the land-a subject about which there is
much nicety and refinement of learning, a consideration
of which would, in this case, be unprofitable-it is suf-
ficient for our purposes here to determine that it is a
covenant which restricts the use of land to a particular
purpose, and which is binding on all those taking title to
the property with notice thereof."
The doctrine has been applied in a number of other Virginia
cases, 2 1 and more recently in Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental
Can Co.,22 where the court upheld a covenant whereby the original
grantor, a corporation, had agreed not to engage in the manufac-
ture of wood pulp on property retained by it. The court said:
This particular type of covenant which equity is will-
ing to enforce against assignees taking with notice has been
ously described. As stated in Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va.
533, 2 S.E.2d 355: 'It is often referred to, from the Eng-
lish case that is its foundation, as the doctrine of Tulk v.
Moxhay.' It is also called the doctrine of restrictive cov-
enants in equity, and the rights and obligations established
by it are known as equitable easements and equitable
servitudes. The doctrine is, in brief, that when, on a
transfer of land, there is a covenant or even an informal
contract or understanding that certain restrictions in the
use of the land conveyed shall be observed, the restrictions
will be enforced by equity, at the suit of the party or par-
ties intended to be benefited thereby, against any subse-
qeunt owner of the land except a purchaser for value
without notice of the agreement.
2
3
The doctrine has also been the basis for equitable enforcement
20 Board of Supervisors of Bedford County v. Bedford High School, 92
Va. 292, 295, 23 S.E. 299, 300 (1895).
21 Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 138 S.E. 545 (1927); Oliver v. Hewitt,
191 Va. 163, 60 S.E. 2d 1 (1950).
22 196 Va. 935, 86 S.E. 2d 128 (1955).
2 3 1d. at 946.
of restrictions in regard to a number of related problems which
do not precisely fit the fact pattern of Tulk v. Moxhay.24
Conclusion.
The role of the attorney in regard to restrictive covenants is
primarily a dual one of interpretation and draftsmanship. The pur-
pose of this short discussion has been merely to aid the attorney in
avoiding pitfalls in this area by pointing up some of the problems
which may arise, leaving to him the more searching investigation
of the law of covenants.
R. D. K.
9-APPENDIX OF FORMS
A. Attorney's Opinion of Title (Letter to Client)
Dear
In accordance with your request of , I hereby
certify that I have made an examination of the title to that parcel
of real estate situated in , Virginia, and particularly de-
scribed by deed dated ., recorded , in Deed
Book ., page , found in the Clerk's Office of
, made by and , husband and
wife, and certify that in my opinion, based upon a normal search,
made in the usual and customary manner, of the records filed in
said Clerk's Office, as disclosed by the general indices thereof, from
to the present date, there is a good and indefeasible
title in fee simple vested in , by said Deed, subject only
to such liens, defects, and objections as hereinafter mentioned.
I further certify that, according to the indices of the record,
there are no unsatisfied mortgages or deeds of trust on said prop-
erty; that there are no unsatisfied judgments or attachments, con-
tract, lis pendens, or transcripts of bankruptcy proceedings that are
liens against or affect the title to said real estate, except:
[Here insert such exceptions as exist, if any]
That, according to the records of the Treasurer's Office of
24 See Note, 39 Va.L.Rev. 703 (1953) for a collection of Virginia cases.
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., there are no unpaid taxes, levies, or special assessments
that are liens against said real estate, except the following:
[Here insert such exceptions as exist, if any]
That there are no unsatisfied or unreleased mechanics liens,
according to the indices, except:
[Here insert such exceptions as exist, if any]
In addition, the following general contractors, subcontractors,
and material men have not been paid in full for work done or mate-
rials supplied to the said real estate, as established by the accom-
panying affidavit of (present owner)
That there are no recorded leases or contracts to lease shown
by the indices in said Clerk's Office;
That the fee simple title to said real estate is subject to the
following covenants, party-wall agreements, mineral leases, ease-
ments, rights of way, and conditions (with) (without) rights of
re-entry or forfeiture, as established by the indices of the records
in said Clerk's Office:
The rights, not revealed by the search of the records, of the
person or persons now in possession of the said real estate should
be investigated, particularly as to rights acquired by adverse po-
session, easements by implication or by prescription, leases for pe-
riods up to five years, contracts to lease for less than one year, or
other actual encroachments or restrictions on the premises.
I further advise that there be made an examination and in-
spection of the property as to boundaries, area, and the location
thereon of improvements, with a survey if necessary. You should
also determine whether there are any zoning ordinances or
restrictions or other governmental regulations affecting said real
estate, and whether there are any pending proceedings for improve-
ments which may result in liens upon said real estate.
Attorney
B. Letter to Lending Institution
Gentlemen:
This letter is to certify that I have searched the title to that
parcel of land described in that certain (deed of trust) (mortgage)
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dated (recorded date) , and of record in the Clerk's Office of the
City of Williamsburg and the County of James City, Virginia, in
the (city) (county) Deed Book . page , con-
veying that certain property situated in the (city of) (county of)
Virginia, from and _ husband and
wife, to and trustees.
I do further certify that, by a normal s( irch, made in the
usual and customary manner, of the records filed in said Clerk's
Office, as disclosed by the general indices thereof, from
to the present date, the good and indefeasible fee simple ownership
of the above-mentioned parcel of land is vested in
and , husband and wife, and the above-mentioned
(deed of trust) (mortgage) constitutes a valid first lien on said prop-
erty, and that there are no other enforceable liens or encumbrances,
ascertainable from a normal search of the indices, binding on the
said parcel of land, except for the following taxes, levies, and assess-
ments as certified by the Treasurer's Office, which are liens but
not delinquent or subject to penalty:
Dated: (date of recording of Deed of Trust) Attorney
R. C. V.
